Parents Know Best: Revising Our Approach to Parental Custody Agreements by Jellum, Linda
Parents Know Best: Revising Our Approach to
Parental Custody Agreements
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Historically, parents have not been able to determine custody of their children
prior to marriage in the form of a prenuptial agreement. Although parents are
able to enter into such agreements, courts normally have a great deal of latitude
in ignoring these agreements. A majority of states merely consider the agreement
as one factor in determining what is in the child's best interest, while the
majority of the rest presume the agreement is in the best interest of the child
unless the judge finds otherwise. Only two states defer to the parental agreement
unless it would be harmful to the child. This Article maintains that this "'parental
deference standard" is the best of the three standards for three reasons. First,
this standard would lead to better decision-making because it would remove the
decision from the hands of judges. Second, this standard would significantly
improve the child-custody process. Third, this standard best respects the parents'
fundamental right to make parenting decisions for their children.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Abolitionist and feminist Lucy Stone and anti-slavery activist Henry B.
Blackwell drafted one of the earliest prenuptial agreements. Prior to their
marriage in 1855, they agreed that if they were ever to separate, they would
submit any marital issues that they were unable to resolve themselves, including
the custody of any future child, to a tripartite arbitration panel.1 At that time,
wives lived under a system of coverture, where married women were not legally
equal to their husbands.2 Ms. Stone and Mr. Blackwell believed marriage should
be an equal partnership. Because state law did not reflect this perception of
marriage, they decided privately to resolve any marital dispute without resort to a
court.3 However, states were not so quick to accept this view of marriage and
were even less willing to allow parents to determine the custody of their children.
Nevertheless, parents should be the ones to decide custody, not judges.
Ideally, custody decisions should be removed from the legal system altogether.
4
1 E. Gary Spitko, Reclaiming the "Creatures of the State ": Contracting for Child Custody
Decisionmaking in the Best Interests of the Family, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1139, 1141
(2000) (arguing that parents should be free to agree to mandatory, binding arbitration to decide
custody issues). But see Miller v. Miller, 620 A.2d 1161, 1165-66 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993)
(holding that mandatory arbitration provisions in a settlement agreement are valid, but courts
are not bound by the award); Glauber v. Glauber, 600 N.Y.S.2d 740, 743 (N.Y. App. Div.
1993) (holding that mandatory arbitration provisions in a settlement agreement are not binding
on the court).
2 See generally MICHAEL GROSSBERG, GOVERNING THE HEARTH: LAW AND THE FAMILY
IN N NETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 242 (1985).
3 Spitko, supra note 1, at 1141.
4Furthermore, child support issues would also be removed from the judge. Under most
states' child support guidelines, the award is reduced when the non-custodial parent cares for
the child for a substantial portion of the month. The prospect of lower support payments
encourages some parents to seek a heftier visitation schedule than they can actually maintain.
But the "dollars for days" formula also discourages the custodial parent from agreeing to
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Imagine a system in which the parents themselves determine custody with
minimal court involvement. Imagine further that the system not only allowed
parents to make these decisions, but also expected it of them. Such a system
could, but does not currently, exist. Even though parents can make agreements
regarding the custody of their children prior to and during the divorce process, 5
under most states' laws, judges decide custody under a standard that allows them
wide discretion to reject parental agreements. Ultimately, parents are not making
custody decisions; judges are.
This Article proposes that states defer to the agreements that fit parents make
regarding child custody so long as the child will not be harmed. In making this
argument, this Article first traces the early judicial reluctance to enforce
prenuptial, postnuptial, and separation agreements and specifically to enforce
child custody provisions of these agreements. Today, prenuptial, postnuptial, and
separation agreements have gained widespread acceptance. However, not all
provisions of marital agreements 6 are enforced equally. While alimony and
property distribution provisions are enforced, child-custody provisions are
uniformly rejected.7
Because courts generally enforce monetary terms, such as alimony, more
readily than non-monetary terms, such as custody, one family law scholar
suggests that neither should be enforced.8 Specifically, she argues that courts find
it difficult to enforce non-monetary terms (such as conduct within marriage) and
refuse to enforce non-monetary terms that affect the welfare of the child.9 She
further suggests that the non-monetary terms are generally more important to
women, while the monetary terms, such as property distribution and alimony, are
generally more important to men.10 Because the courts do not enforce terms
equally, women are disproportionately impacted. 1 Thus, she concludes that
reasonable visitation. "[C]hild support schedules and community property rules-both of which
introduce more certainty into the outcome if a case is contested---may make it easier for
mothers to resist strategic claims by fathers." ELEANOR E. MACCOBY & ROBERT H. MNIOOKIN,
DIviDiNG THE CHILD: SocIAL AND LEGAL DILEMMAS OF CUSTODY 157 (1992) [hereinafter
DIVIDING THE CHILD].
5 See Shoup v. Shoup, 556 S.E.2d 783, 787 (Va. Ct. App. 2001) ("Divorcing parents may
and, indeed, are encouraged under Virginia public policy, to reach agreement respecting the
care and support of their minor children.").
6 The term "marital agreement" will be used to refer to all agreements made during
marriage, including prenuptial, postnuptial, and separation agreements.
7 Katharine B. Silbaugh, Marriage Contracts and the Family Economy, 93 Nw. U. L.
REv. 65, 78 (1998).
8 Id. at 69.
9 Id. at 78.
10 Id. at 70.
11 Id.
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courts should not enforce either term in a prenuptial agreement. 2 This Article
concludes just the opposite: that both types of terms should be equally enforced.
After describing the judicial reluctance to enforce any provision in marital
agreements, this Article identifies the three standards that states currently use
when parents in a divorce action have made such a custody agreement. Most
states regard the parental agreement, if at all, as one factor in an analysis of what
is in the child's best interest ("the best interest standard"). 13 Some states presume
that the parental agreement is in the child's best interest, but require the judge to
reject the agreement if it is not ("the presumption standard"). 14 Finally, West
Virginia requires judges to defer to the parental agreement unless it would be
harmful to the child ("the parental deference standard"). 15 Thus, under the best
interest standard, judges may enforce parental agreements; under the presumption
standard, judges should enforce these agreements; and under the parental
deference standard, judges must enforce these agreements unless the child would
be harmed.
This Article argues that the parental deference standard is the best of the three
standards for three reasons. First, this standard would lead to better decision-
making because it would remove the decision from judges' hands and place it
back where it belongs-with the parents. Second, it would significantly improve
the child-custody process. Child custody hearings would be unnecessary when fit
parents make non-hannful custody arrangements. Third, and most importantly,
the parental deference standard best respects parents' fundamental right to make
parenting decisions for their children. This Article explores the constitutional
issues raised by all three standards under Troxel v. Granville.16 This Article will
show that the best interest standard infringes on parents' fundamental right to
make child custody decisions because it fails to defer to decisions made by fit
parents. 17 In contrast, the parental deference standard does not.
12 Id. at 122-23.
13 See discussion infra Part I. A.
14 See discussion infra Part I. B.
15 See discussion infra Part HI. C.
16 530 U.S. 57 (2000).
17 This Article does not address whether parents should be able to circumvent child
support obligations through custody agreements. In 1984, Congress enacted federal legislation
requiring states to enact child support guidelines. Child Support Enforcement Amendments of
1984, Pub. L. No. 98-378, 98 Stat. 1321 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 667 (2000)).
Because of the federal statute, the ability of parents to draft agreements that reduce their support
obligations under their state's guidelines is doubtful. See, e.g., Cox v. Cox, 776 P.2d 1045, 1048
(Alaska 1989) (holding that state's presumptive guidelines enacted pursuant to federal law
preclude custody agreements waiving child support unless approved by the court). The ability
of parents to draft agreements that increase their support obligations is also questionable. See
generally, Kenneth G. Southerlin, Jr., Comment, Family Law-Berryhill v. Rhodes: Attempts to
Circumvent Child Support Obligations Through Private Child Support Agreements Violate
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While many legal scholars have analyzed the various child custody standards,
most have ignored parental agreements. Interestingly, the American Law Institute
("ALI") has addressed such agreements and adopted the parental deference
standard for agreements made during the divorce process. According to the ALI,
a court must enforce a separation agreement unless voluntary consent by one of
the parties was lacking or the agreement would be harmful to the child.Y
8
However, the ALI rejected this standard for prenuptial and postnuptial
agreements, which are made prior to the divorce proceedings.' 9 The ALI
concluded that parents are less likely to have thoroughly explored the impact of
their custody choices when they make agreements prior to the divorce. 20 This
Article disagrees with this conclusion and argues that either the parental deference
or the presumption standard raises fewer constitutional issues and will lead to a
better custody process.
Because deferring to parental agreements is such a novel approach to child
custody, the parental deference standard will likely meet considerable resistance.
As discussed below, judges historically refused to enforce any marital
agreements.
II. THE HISTORY OF MARITAL AGREEMENTS
A. Alimony and Property Distribution Clauses
Although many do not think of it in this way, marriage is essentially an oral
contract between partners.21 The partners have legally enforceable rights and
duties both towards each other and towards any children born to them.22 Divorce
Public Policy, 32 U. MEM. L. REv. 767 (2002) (discussing Tennessee's reluctance to enforce
private child support agreements); cf In Re Marriage of Bereznak and Heminger, 2 Cal. Rptr.
3d 351 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003).
18AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION:
ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 2.06 (2002) (hereinafter "ALI PRINCIPLES").
19Id. § 2.08 crnt. i.
20 Id.
21 See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 663 (1972) (Burger, J., dissenting); see also
Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert E. Scott, Marriage as Relational Contract, 84 VA. L. Rrv. 1225,
1244-50 (1998) (suggesting that marriage should be viewed as contract rather than as a status
conferred by the state); Silbaugh, supra note 7, at 111-20 (discussing the difference between
the contract view and the status view of marriage and concluding that the debate does not
explain whether prenuptial agreements should be enforced). Legal economists argue that under
no-fault divorce laws, the marriage contract is illusory. The removal of fault based divorce
grounds eliminates any remedy for breach, thus making the contract unenforceable. Scott &
Scott, supra, at 1241 (citing Margaret F. Brinig & Steven M. Crafton, Marriage and
Opportunism, 23 J. LEGAL STuD. 869, 871 (1994)).
22 Stanley, 405 U.S. at 663 (Burger, J., dissenting).
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is a breach of that contract. Because the marriage contract does not explicitly
anticipate breach, divorce law developed to define and impose society's divorce
expectations. Not all divorcing partners appreciated the states' willingness to
define the terms of their separation. Thus, marital agreements were developed to
avoid the states' default laws.
Prior to 1970, courts routinely refused to enforce marital agreements. While
the courts were willing to enforce property distribution clauses in agreements
contemplating a spouse's death, they refused to enforce these same agreements
when they contemplated divorce. Courts were concerned that these agreements
encouraged or sanctified divorce23 and that they would usurp the role of the court
in determining settlement rights.24 There was a fear that these agreements would
allow divorcing husbands to avoid paying support to needy wives.25 Further,
courts were concerned that women would be taken advantage of due to unequal
bargaining power.26 Thus, courts looked at these agreements with skepticism,
born from paternalistic concern.
In response to the changing societal perception of marriage and divorce, the
courts began to re-evaluate their paternalistic position. In 1970, the Florida
supreme court transformed prenuptial and antenuptial doctrine in Posner v.
Posner.27 In that seminal case, the court stated that "[antenuptial agreements]
should no longer be held to be void ab initio as 'contrary to public policy.' 28
The Florida supreme court's opinion discarded years of judicial skepticism of
marital agreements. 29 Other jurisdictions soon followed. 30
Although courts began to enforce them, marital agreements were not
enforced as contracts. Unlike other contracts, marital agreements were scrutinized
23 Or, alternatively they would discourage a party in a bad marriage from seeking divorce.
Allison A. Marston, Note, Planning for Love: The Politics ofPrenuptial Agreements, 49 STAN.
L. REv. 887, 897 (1997) (noting that prenuptials that addressed property rights for surviving
spouses were honored).
24 Id.
25 Id.
26 Id. (citing Stilley v. Folger, 14 Ohio 610, 613 (Ohio 1846)); see Neilson v. Neilson, 780
P.2d 1264, 1267 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (" '[S]uch agreements tended to limit the rights of an
unsophisticated prospective spouse .... [T]his spouse could not negotiate a fair contract with
the other spouse because of differences in sophistication and bargaining power.' ") (citations
omitted).
27 233 So. 2d 381 (Fla. 1970).
28 Id. at 385.
29 1d. at 384 (citing Hudson v. Hudson, 350 P.2d 596 (Okla. 1960) (reversing a trial
court's award as unjustified under the terms of the parties' prenuptial agreement)).
30 See e.g., Buettner v. Buettner, 505 P.2d 600, 602 (Nev. 1973) (citing Posner v. Posner,
233 So. 2d 381 (Fla. 1970)); Burtoff v. Burtoff, 418 A.2d 1085, 1089 (D.C. 1980) (citing
Posner v. Posner, 233 So. 2d 381 (Fla. 1970)).
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for both procedural and substantive fairness.31 Procedural fairness tested the
agreement at the time it was executed.32 Substantive fairness tested the agreement
at the time of enforcement. 33 Thus, for a marital agreement to be procedurally
fair, the parties must have fully disclosed all assets, must have obtained separate
counsel, must have disclosed any rights being waived, and/or must have had
sufficient time to review the agreement. 34
Courts tested the agreement both at the time it was executed and at the time it
was enforced for substantive fairness or reasonableness. 35 The courts had
tremendous ability to set aside terms they found unfair.36 Traditional contract
principles would not have allowed courts to review these terms for
reasonableness, only, at most, for procedural fairness. 37 Thus, while marital
agreements were enforced, their terms were subject to judicial oversight.
Substantive fairness was eliminated in West Virginia in 1985 in Gant v.
Gant.3 8 In that case, the husband and wife signed a prenuptial agreement the day
before they married in which the wife waived all right to alimony in the event of
divorce. 39 Eventually the couple divorced, and the wife sought alimony. The trial
court held that the agreement was unenforceable because the wife was not
represented by counsel at the time she signed it and because the agreement was
unfair.40
The West Virginia supreme court reversed the lower court as to the validity
of the prenuptial agreement and upheld the agreement.41 The court took the
opportunity to examine the rule that allowed a trial court to scrutinize prenuptial
agreements for substantive faimess.42 The court decided that the current law
reflected an outdated view of women and marriage.43 The court concluded that
prenuptial agreements should be treated no differently from other contracts:
because courts do not routinely inquire into the reasonableness of a contract either
at the time of its execution or at breach, courts should not inquire into the
31 Silbaugh, supra note 7, at 74.
32 Id.
3 3 Id. at75.
34 Id.
35 Id. at75.
36Id.
37 Silbaugh, supra note 7, at 75.
38 329 S.E.2d 106 (W.Va. 1985).
3 9 Id. at 109.
40Id. at 111.
41 Id. at 111, 118.
4 2 Id. at 114.
4 3 Id. at 112.
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reasonableness of a prenuptial agreement either at the time it is made or at the
time of divorce.44 The court reasoned that the general contract safeguards of
fraud, duress, misrepresentation, and unconscionability would sufficiently protect
the parties.45 In breaking somewhat with traditional contract principles, the court
required that the "circumstances at the time the marriage ends [be] roughly what
the parities foresaw at the time they entered into the prenuptial agreement. '46 The
court specifically mentioned that the birth of children would be a relevant factor
for a court to consider when determining if the circumstances were foreseeable. 47
Today, a few states have followed West Virginia's lead and eliminated
substantive fairness from judicial consideration of marital agreements. 48
However, most states continue to review these agreements with skepticism and
judicial oversight.49 While the trend is toward enforcing marital agreements as
written, courts are hesitant to step away from their paternalistic perception that
these agreements are inherently unfair to women.50 Moreover, not all provisions
44 Gant, 329 S.E.2d at 114.
45Id. at 116.
46 Id.
4 7 
Id.
48 See, e.g., COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14-10-112(2) (West 2003) ("[T]he terms of the
separation agreement... are binding upon the court unless it finds ... that the separation
agreement is unconscionable."); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-201(2) (2003) ("[T]he terms of the
separation agreement... are binding upon the court unless it finds ... that the separation
agreement is unconscionable."). In Simeone v. Simeone, 581 A.2d 162 (Pa. 1990), the
Pennsylvania supreme court affirmed a lower court's ruling enforcing a prenuptial agreement.
The court decided that reviewing prenuptial agreements for substantive fairness reflected an
outdated view of women and their bargaining power. Id. at 165. The court decided that the
general contract safeguards of fraud, duress, and misrepresentation would sufficiently protect
the parties. Id. at 166-67. In breaking somewhat with traditional contract principles, the court
made clear that a full and fair disclosure of the parties' financial positions was still required. Id.
at 167. Accord Laird v. Laird, 597 P.2d 463, 467 (Wyo. 1979). The Uniform Premarital
Agreement Act of 1983 expressly favors freedom of contract for marrying parties and limits
review of substantive fairness to "unconscionability." UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT § 6,
9c U.L.A. 49 (2001). But see WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 26.09.070(3) (West 1997) ("[T]he
[separation] contract... shall be binding upon the court unless it finds ... that the separation
contract was unfair at the time of its execution.").
49 For a novel approach, see Theodore F. Hass, The Rationality and Enforceability of
Contractual Restrictions on Divorce, 66 N.C. L. REV, 879 (1988). The author suggests that
spouses contractually limit, directly or indirectly, their right to a no-fault divorce. Id. at 894. The
author suggests that the parties draft a prenuptial agreement that would allow them to divorce
only for traditional fault based reasons. Id. Any party seeking a no-fault divorce would be
penalized by, among other things, losing custody of the children. Id. at 917-18.
50 "Other courts view requiring independent counsel as 'constitut[ing] a paternalistic and
unwarranted interference with the parties' freedom to enter contracts.' This position ignores the
reality that judicial review of prenuptial agreements and the attendant evaluation of each party's
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of marital agreements are equally enforced. The next Section discusses the fact
that, until recently, child-custody provisions were routinely rejected by the courts.
B. Child Custody Provisions
Traditionally, judges did not enforce parental custody agreements because of
the state's obligation to protect the interests of children.51 Courts routinely stated
that no private agreement of the parties would bar the courts from determining
what was in the best interest of the child.52 For agreements made prior to the
divorce, judges were concerned about the possibility for coercive bargaining
between the parents, who may have different bargaining strengths due to
domestic violence or the degree to which the parent wants custody of the child.53
For agreements made during the divorce, judges did not trust parents to act
responsibly toward their children while they were caught up in the acrimony of
divorce.54 Thus, historically, states refused to enforce any custody agreement at
all, regardless of whether the agreement was made before the marriage, after the
marriage, or at the time of the divorce.55
educational and financial background is already a paternalistic exercise." Marston, supra note
23, at 915.
51 See, e.g., Williams v. Williams, 205 S.W.2d 949,953 (Mo. Ct. App. 1947) (holding that
oral prenuptial agreement by father to give stepmother legal custody of father's child would not
be binding but would be considered as a factor in determining what was in the child's best
interest).
52 See Glauber v. Glauber, 600 N.Y.S.2d 740, 742 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993) ("It is already
well established by both statute and case law that contracts entered into by the parents with
regard to the fate of their children are not binding on the courts.... [T]he responsibility [is on]
the courts to make custody and visitation orders based upon the best interests of the child."). For
example, in Ekelem v. Ekelem, 2003 WL 21014972, at *1 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 16, 2003), the
mother and father entered into a prenuptial agreement that provided that if they had children,
the parties would seek joint custody. When the parties separated, however, the mother sought
sole custody. Id. The trial court awarded custody to the mother and visitation to the father. 1d. at
*4. Arguing that" 'profoundly limiting visitation'.. . [was] contrary to the parties' antenuptial
agreement ...." the pro se father appealed. Id. at *6. Affirming, the appellate court stated,
"Even if the prenuptial agreement mandated joint custody, which it does not, this would not
affect the trial court's authority, indeed, obligation, to determine custody and parenting time in
accordance with the best interests of the children." Id. Accord Schwab v. Schwab, 505 N.W.2d
752, 758 (S.D. 1993); McManus v. Howard, 569 So. 2d 1213, 1215 (Miss. 1990); Miller v.
Miller, 620 A.2d 1161, 1165-66 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993).
53 ALl PRINCIPLES, supra note 18, § 2.06 cmt. b.
54 Id. cmt. a. (citing Ford v. Ford, 371 U.S. 187, 193 (1962) ("[T]he estrangement of
husband and wife beclouds parental judgment with emotion and prejudice.").
55 See, e.g., Mancuso v. Mancuso, 789 So. 2d 1249 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001). In this case,
the appellate court reversed the trial judge's order enforcing a provision of the settlement
agreement that allowed the fifteen-month-old child to be rotated between the parents every
forty-eight hours. The trial judge believed she was without authority to reject the rotation
2004]
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Today, this refusal to enforce these agreements has given way.56 Jurisdictions
have begun to recognize that parents, not judges, can better decide who should be
raising their children.
III. CURRENT PARENTAL AGREEMENT STANDARDS: DESCRIPTION,
STRENGTHS, AND WEAKNESSES
When parents agree on the custody of their children, there are three standards
judges use in deciding whether to honor these agreements. First, the vast majority
of states require the judge to consider the agreement as one factor in a best interest
analysis. 57 These states give no deference to parental agreements; rather, the
judge's determination of the best interest of the child controls the decision.58
Second, some states require judges to presume these agreements are in the best
interest of the child, but require judges to set the agreements aside when the judge
determines that the agreements are not in the child's best interest.59 These states
give some weight to parental agreements, but ultimately the judge's determination
of the best interest of the child controls the decision.60 Third, in West Virginia,
judges must defer to the agreement unless it would harm the child or it was not
voluntary.61 Under this standard, judges defer to parental agreements and the best
interests of the child are essentially irrelevant.62 These standards will be explained
and evaluated below.
provision. Neither party challenged the rotation provision on appeal, but the appellate court sua
sponte reversed and remanded the case for the trial court to determine whether the rotation
provision was in the child's best interest. The Uniform Premarital Agreement Act does not
include child custody as a topic that can be negotiated. UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT
§ 3(a), 9c U.L.A. 43 (2001). While it does not specifically exclude child custody, the Act does
specifically exclude child support and any other matter violating public policy. Id. §§ 3(a)(8),
(b).
56 See discussion infra Part III.
57 See discussion infra Part IIl.A.
581Id.
59 See discussion infra Part III.B.
60 Id.
61 See discussion infra Part III. C.
62 Id.
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Breakdown of Parental Agreement Standards By State
Best Interest
Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Florida
Hawaii
Idaho
Indiana
Kentucky
Maryland
Massachusetts
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
New Hampshire
New Mexico
New York
North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Dakota
Tennessee
Utah
Virginia
Washington
Wisconsin
Wyoming
Presumption
Califomia**
Connecticut**
District of Columbia
Georgia
Illinois**
Iowa**
Kansas
Louisiana
Maine **
Michigan
Minnesota**
Mississippi**
Nevada**
New Jersey
North Carolina
South Carolina
Texas
Vermont**
Parental Deference
Oregon***
West Virginia
* These states use the deference standard only for parental agreements for joint
custody. For all other agreements, these states use the best interest standard.
** These states use the presumption standard only for parental agreements for
joint custody. For all other agreements, these states use the best interest standard.
*** This state requires judges to enforce without exception parental agreements
for joint custody. For all other agreements, it uses the best interest standard.
I E
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A. The Best Interest Standard
In most states, no deference is given to parental agreements. Rather, the
custody agreement is considered, if at all, as little more than the parents'
preference for custody, and thus one element to consider in a best interest
analysis. 63 Many states that use the best interest standard do not even
acknowledge in their statutes that parental agreements exist at all.64 For example,
in Delaware, judges are directed to take the parents' preferences for custody into
consideration, but the statute does not mention parental agreements at all.65 While
Arizona's statute does mention parental agreements, it does not contemplate the
possibility that the parties might agree to anything beyond joint custody.66
In two states, the presumption is actually against enforcing these agreements,
but the standard remains the best interest of the child. For example, in Ohio, "[t]he
court shall not approve a [custody] plan... unless it determines that the plan is in
the best interest of the children."'67 In Vermont, the court must refuse to enforce
any agreement that is not in a child's best interest.68
But most states that use the best interest standard recognize that parents make
these agreements and permit or encourage, but do not require, judges to award
63 See, e.g., Braun v. Headley, 750 A.2d 624, 636 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2000) (stating that
the desires of the natural parents and agreements between them are one factor for a judge to
consider in a best interest analysis).
64 Delaware, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Nevada, and New Mexico direct their
courts to consider the wishes of the parents and the wishes of the child in a best interest analysis
but do not mention parental agreements. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 722(a)(1) (1999) (directing
the court to consider all relevant factors including the wishes of the child's parents); IDAHO
CODE § 32-717(1)(a) (Michie Supp. 2003); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/602(a)(1) (West
1999); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-17-2-8(2) (West 1999 & Supp. 2003); KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 403.270(2)(a) (Michie 1999 & Supp. 2003); NEV. REv. STAT. ANN. § 125.480(4)(b) (Michie
1998); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-4-9(A)(1) (Michie 1999). Hawaii, North Dakota, Tennessee, and
Utah direct their courts to consider the wishes of the child in a best interest analysis, but do not
even mention the wishes of the parents. HAw. REV. STAT. § 571-46 (1993 & Supp. 2001); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 14-09-06.2(1) (1997); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-6-106(a) (2001); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 30-3-10 (Supp. 2003). Arkansas, Virginia and Wyoming make no mention of the
parents' or child's preferences being a factor in a best interest analysis. ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-
13-101(a)(1)(A) (Michie Supp. 2001); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-124.2 (Michie Supp. 2003); WYo.
STAT. ANN. § 20-2-201 (Michie 2003).
65 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 722(a)(1) (1999) (directing the court to consider all relevant
factors including the wishes of the child's parents).
66 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-403(C) (West Supp. 2003) (allowing court to order for
joint custody when both parents agree and the order is in the best interest of the child).
67 OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 3109.04(D)(1)(aXi) (Anderson 2003).
68 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 666(c) (2002); accord WIS. STAT. ANN. § 767.1 1(12)(a)
(West 2001 & Supp. 2003) (allowing court to reject custody agreement reached during
mediation based on the best interest of the child).
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custody consistent with the parents' agreement.69 Also, these states require judges
to reject these agreements when they are not in the best interest of the child. For
example, Alaska requires its judges to review written agreements between the
spouses to determine if the terms are just and in the best interest of the child.70 In
Oklahoma, the court shall order custody of the children based on the plan
submitted by the parents with any changes deemed by the court to be in the best
interest of the child.71 Similarly, in Nebraska, the court may reject a parenting
plan if it is not in the child's best interest.72 Indeed, after conducting a hearing and
specifically finding that joint custody is in the best interest of the child, a
Nebraska court may order joint custody regardless of any parental agreement to
the contrary. 73 South Carolina developed a similar standard judicially. In South
Carolina, "[t]he general rule of law is that a contract between parents as to the
custody of children will be recognized and enforced by the courts unless the
welfare of the children requires a different disposition." 74
In a few states, the statutes address the role of parental agreements so
opaquely that judges may set aside parental custody agreements ostensibly for
any reason at all. For example, in Florida, a consent order that incorporates a
parental custody agreement "shall be reviewed by the court and, if approved,
entered. '75 The statute does not define when these agreements should be
approved. In Massachusetts, the court may reject the parental agreement and
award sole legal and physical custody to either parent.76 Again, the statute does
not limit the discretion of judges to reject the agreement. Similarly, in Mississippi,
if the court finds the written parental agreement is "adequate and sufficient," the
69 See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-4-9.1(D) (Michie 1999) ("In any case in which the
parents agree to a form of custody, the court should award custody consistent with the
agreement unless the court determines that such agreement is not in the best interests of the
child.") (emphasis added).
70 ALASKA STAT. § 25.24.220(dX2) (Michie 2002); accord TEx. FAMILY CODE ANN.
§ 153.007(b) (Vernon 2002) (directing the court to enter an order consistent with the parents'
agreement if it is in the child's best interest).
71 OKLA. STAT. ANN. fit. 43, § 109(D) (West 2001); accord 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN.
5/602-1(b)-(c) (West 1999) ("Upon the application of either or both parents ... the court shall
consider an award of joint custody .... if it determines that joint custody would be in the best
interests of the child....").
72 NEB. REv. STAT. ANN. § 43-2917 (Michie 1999).
73 NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 42-364(5) (Michie 1999); accord N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 458:17(II)(a) (1992 & Supp. 2003) (allowing court to refuse to order joint custody regardless
of any custody agreement to the contrary after conducting a hearing and specifically finding that
joint custody is not in the best interest of the child).
74 Crowe v. Lowe, 182 S.E.2d 310, 312 (S.C. 1971).
75 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.183(2) (West 1997).
76 MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 208, § 31 (Law Co-op. 2003).
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agreement may be incorporated into the judgment. 77 Adequate and sufficient are
not defined. In Montana, "the terms of the separation agreement, except those
providing for the support, parenting, and parental contact with children, are
binding upon the court .... -78 But the statute is silent regarding the effect of a
custody term.79 Statutes of such a vague standard even allow judges to reject
more easily parental agreements than statutes with clearer standards. Moreover,
appellate review is more effective when there are standards to evaluate judicial
decision-making. 80 But these states should make the standard in their statutes
clearer.
A few states that use the best interest standard impose somewhat tighter
limits on judges. These states also view parental agreements as one element in a
best interest analysis, but they require judges to explain on the record their
reasons for rejecting the parental agreement. In Missouri, Pennsylvania, and
Wisconsin, when the judge "declines to enter an order awarding custody either as
agreed to by the parents or under the plan developed by the parents, the court shall
state its reasons for denial on the record." 81 While statutes that require judges to
explain their reasoning place somewhat tighter control on judicial discretion,
these states leave the decision-making control in the judge's hands rather than the
parents. When reasons are given on the record, it is easier for the reviewing court
to determine whether the trial court abused its discretion.82
States that use the best interest standard thus consider parental agreements as
merely one factor83 in a best interest analysis. Judges are required to reject any
77 Miss. CODE ANN. § 93-5-2(2) (West 1999).
78 MONT. CODEANN. § 40-4-201(2) (2003).
79 Accord WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.09.070(3) (West 1997) (requiring separation
agreements to be binding on the court except "for those terms providing for a parenting plan for
their children ...
80 See, e.g., Dinius v. Dinius, 448 N.W.2d 210, 213 (N.D. 1989).
81 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5307 (West 2001); see also Mo. ANN. STAT. § 452.375(6)
(West 2003); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 767.1 1(12)(a) (West 2001) ("The court shall state in writing
its reasons for rejecting al [mediation] agreement.") In Sleater v. Sleater, 42 S.W.3d 821, 824
(Mo. Ct. App. 2001), the appellate court reversed when the trial court did not accept the
parental agreement and failed to make written findings to support its decision to reject it.
82 For example, in Tompkins v. Baker, 997 S.W.2d 84, 91 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999), the trial
court cited only the parties' stipulation as evidence that enforcing the settlement agreement was
in the child's best interest. The appellate court reversed and remanded saying that the trial
court's decision was not supported by substantial evidence because the parties' agreement
should only have been one factor in a best interest analysis.
83 See, e.g., Neu v. Neu, 303 A.D.2d 509, 510 (N.Y. App. Div. 2003) ("While 'no
agreement can bind the court to a particular disposition, the parties' own agreement as to who
should have custody constitutes a 'weighty factor' to which priority should be accorded absent
extraordinary circumstances.' ") (quoting Alanna M. v. Duncan M., 204 A.D.2d 409 (N.Y.
App. Div 1994) (holding that where children had been living with father for two and a half
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agreement that is not in the child's best interest. Only in a few states must judges
explain their decision to reject the agreement on the record.84
1. Strengths of the Best Interest Standard
The best interest standard leaves judges with enormous discretion to decide
child custody. This wide discretion is both its greatest benefit and its greatest
downfall. Better decisions can be made when judges have the widest possible
discretion to take into account that circumstances have changed since the
agreement was made. 85 For example, prenuptial and postnuptial parental
agreements are often made long before the divorce. Under this standard, judges
need not give them much, if any, weight because the age of the agreement would
affect its relevance if circumstances have changed. Additionally, agreements
made prior to the birth of a child and while the child is young would be less likely
to reflect a child's current needs than one made while the divorce is in process.
The best interest standard allows judges to make these distinctions.
When judges have wide discretion to reject parental agreements, there is a
better chance that the best decision for each child can be made, but at what cost?
years pursuant to parents' agreement, it was not abuse of discretion for court to award custody
to father)).
84 Interestingly, many of these statutes do not distinguish among agreements made before
the child is born, after the child is born, but before the divorce, and during the divorce. See, e.g.,
23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5307 (West 2001); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 452.375(6) (West 2003).
These statutes do not indicate that the parents' agreement must be made during the divorce
process. In contrast, some statutes do talk about parenting plans, mediation agreements, or
separation agreements, which are generally made during the divorce. See, e.g., Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 767.1 1(12)(a) (West 2001) (referring to "[a]ny agreement which [sic] resolves issues of
legal custody or periods of physical placement between the parties reached as a result of
mediation under this section... "). Theoretically, under these statutes, a parental agreement
made prior to marriage would have the same weight as a parental agreement made during the
divorce.
85 In Keen v. Keen, 629 N.E.2d 938, 940 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994), the court said, "While a
parent's agreement is entitled to great weight, the [parents'] facially ambiguous, perhaps
intrusive, and, under these facts, unworkable agreement, must be subordinated to their child's
best interests and, therefore, was not binding upon the trial court." Interestingly, the court
recognized that parents have a fundamental right to "establish a home and raise their
children .... " Id. at 941. When the parents are capable of carrying out an agreement, the judge
should "refrain from imposing his or her personal conception of a preferential arrangement." Id.
"One obvious exception is when an agreement might endanger the child's physical health or
significantly impair his emotional development." Id. The court created another exception: when
the agreement is not in the child's best interest because it would demand further litigation. Id.
The agreement in this case required "each party to give first option to the other for child care
during periods when either party might otherwise have the child but could not for one reason or
another be with the child on that particular day or during that period." Id. The court found the
use of the term "child care" to be vague and unclear. Keen, 629 N.E.2d at 942.
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2. Weaknesses of the Best Interest Standard
Child custody cannot be effectively litigated because judges are not equipped
to distinguish between two equally fit parents.86 While it is relatively easy to
determine who should have custody when one of the parents is unfit, the decision
is less clear when both parents are fit. The best interest standard does not make
this decision clearer. There is no social consensus on what makes a person better
able to parent a child.87 If society does not agree, judges cannot know which
parent will be the better choice. Absent a presumption for one parent, judges
"who normally lack the ability to 'measure minute gradations of psychological
capacity between two fit parents' would unwisely be called upon to determine
relative parental fitness with scientific 'precision.' "88 One court expressed this
dilemma when it stated, "All too often, we ask our courts to perform services
which they are completely incompetent to provide. The raising of our children is
just one such matter. The courts are simply the wrong tool for the job."'89
The discretion judges retain under this standard encourages litigation. A
standard with wide discretion leads to uncertain results. "[T]he best interests
standard provides an uncertain backdrop for out-of-court negotiations."90 Prior to
litigation, the parties cannot know which of two fit parents a judge is likely to
prefer. Thus, they may refuse to negotiate a settlement under the mistaken belief
that they will win.91 While some statutes include factors to be considered,92 these
86 See Garska v. McCoy, 278 S.E.2d 357, 361 (W. Va. 1981) ("However, it is
emphatically the case that hearings do not enhance justice, particularly since custody fights are
highly destructive to the emotional health of children.").
87 See Mary Becker, Maternal Feelings: Myth, Taboo, and Child Custody, 1 S. CAL. REV.
L. & WOMEN'S STuD. 133, 172 (1992) (asking whether a parent who is laid back and does not
push a child to excel at school or an intense parent who stresses the importance of academic
accomplishment is the better parent).
88 Kathryn L. Mercer, The Ethics of Judicial Decision-Making Regarding Custody of
Minor Children: Looking at the "Best Interest of the Child" and the "Primary
Caretaker" Standards as Utility Rules, 33 IDAHO L. REV. 389, 408-09 (1997) (quoting
Garska, 278 S.E.2d at 360-61).
89 Lamb v. Wenning, 591 N.E.2d 1031, 1034 (hid. Ct. App. 1992), transfer granted, 600
N.E.2d 96 (Ind. 1992) (holding that a parent must demonstrate that an existing order is
unreasonable to change a child's primary physical residence when the parents have joint legal
custody).
90 DIVIDING THE CHILD, supra note 4, at 282 (Because very few cases in fact ever get to a
judge, even though "the best interest standard does potentially confer a great deal of judicial
discretion, that discretion is rarely being exercised directly by a state official.").
91 But see Mary Kate Keamey, The New Paradigm in Custody Law: Looking at Parents
With a Loving Eye, 28 ARiZ. ST. L.J. 543, 553-54 (1996). The author suggests that some
discretion may be desirable since judges are attuned to social nuances and the needs of the
particular case. Additionally, the author suggests that most lawyers who practice in front of a
particular judge have a good sense of what to expect from that judge. Id. at 554.
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standards do not categorically conclude that if a parent meets four of six criteria,
for example, that parent deserves custody.
Additionally, this standard is costly to the litigants. It is difficult for a judge to
comprehend fully the role that each parent has played in the child's development.
Because the judge cannot know which parent is best without assistance, the
parties hire experts to provide guidance. 93 Each testifying expert necessarily
opines that the party doing the hiring is the more qualified parent.94 A standard
that encourages, and even requires, expert testimony is expensive to the litigants
and discriminates against the parent with less money, generally the mother.95
Also, appellate review cannot ensure that the decision that is in the best
interest of the child is actually made.96 indeed, one trial judge stated, "I could
make a decision in this case, in all probability, awarding the children to either one
of the parents and have it stand up to appellate review." 97 Trial court decisions
regarding child custody are reviewed only under a clear abuse of discretion 98 or
clearly erroneous standard.99 Judges are human, not infallible, and their personal
opinions and biases will affect their decision-making. Under a standard that
92 See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-403(A) (West 2000), which lists the following as
factors to be considered: the wishes of the child's parents; the wishes of the child; the
relationship of the child, parent, siblings, and others; the child's adjustment to home, school,
and community; the mental and physical health of all involved; the ability of each parent to
further the relationship of the child with the other parent; the primary caretaker and the
existence of coercion to obtain an agreement regarding custody.
93 Becker, supra note 87, at 173; see, e.g., Lapp v. Lapp, 293 N.W.2d 121, 126-27 (N.D.
1980) (mother hired two experts for trial, father hired one).
94 Becker, supra note 87, at 173.
95 Id. at 173.
96 See, eg, Lapp, 293 N.W.2d at 129 (disagreeing with trial court's decision to award
joint custody on a six month alternating basis but unwilling to disturb the ruling due to the
"clearly erroneous" standard of review); Hensarling v. Hensarling, 824 So. 2d 583, 586-87
(Miss. 2002) ("We may not always agree with a chancellor's decision as to whether the best
interests of a child have been met ... [hiowever, in custody cases, we are bound by the limits of
our standard of review and may reverse only when the decision of the trial court was manifestly
wrong or clearly erroneous .... ).
97 Dinius v. Dinius, 448 N.W.2d 210, 219 (N.D. 1989) (Levine, J., dissenting) (describing
the trial court as having a "flip-a-coin mentality"). In this case, the trial court awarded custody
to the father rather than the primiary caretaking mother. The supreme court affirmed. The
dissent argued that not all the best interest statutory factors should be entitled to equal weight.
Instead, the dissent urged the court to adopt the primary care presumption. Id.
98 See Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So. 2d 1197, 1203 (Fla. 1980) (explaining that
discretion is abused when the trial judge acts arbitrarily or unreasonably).
99 Becker, supra note 87, at 173 ("[t]he record of appellate review in Minnesota, for
example, demonstrates remarkably little interference with trial court custody decisions, despite
the supreme court's obvious endeavor to facilitate appellate review by insisting on highly
particularized trial court findings of fact").
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allows such wide discretion, judges who are influenced by their own perspective
may not make the best decisions for children. 100 Because the best interest
standard provides so little guidance to a judge, judges can make any decision they
wish, so long as they couch it in "best interests of the child" terminology.' 0 '
According to one former trial judge, "the best interest standard leaves the trial
courts with nearly unbridled discretion to decide child custody disputes."'10 2
Additionally, a standard that fails to hold parents accountable both for
making custody decisions and for honoring their agreements promotes bad policy.
While the state should not enforce agreements that would harm children, most
agreements will not. Possibly, parents will make some bad custody agreements,
especially if these agreements are made long before they have children. But
parents can renegotiate their agreements as circumstances change. By not
enforcing these agreements, states encourage parents not to make agreements but
to litigate them instead. Failing to enforce the agreements also deprives the other
parent of the benefit of the bargain.
For example, a father might agree to allow a mother physical custody of their
child so long as the mother agreed not to relocate. After the divorce, once she has
custody, the mother decides to relocate. The father petitions the court to enforce
the agreement. The court refuses, thereby allowing the mother to keep the benefit
of the bargain (she retains custody), but denying the father his benefit (keeping
100 Garska v. McCoy, 278 S.E.2d 357 (W. Va. 1981) shows just how appalling decisions
under the best interest standard can be. In Garska, the mother was only fifteen at the time she
became pregnant by her mother's boyfriend. Id. at 359. She went to live with her grandparents.
Id. After birth, the child had serious respiratory problems, which required frequent
hospitalizations. The mother and grandparents agreed that the grandparents would adopt the
child so that he would qualify for medical insurance. Id The father, who up until this point had
provided no support to the child, petitioned the court for custody. He visited the baby for the
first time and began to send $15.00 a week to the mother for support. Id. Ignoring that the
pregnancy resulted from statutory rape, the trial court awarded custody to the father because he
was better educated, more intelligent, economically more stable, able to provide a better social
environment, better spoken, and had "a better appearance and demeanor." Id.
The West Virginia supreme court agreed that the educational and economic position of the
father was superior to the mother's, but concluded that those factors paled in comparison to the
love, affection, concern, and tolerance the mother had already provided. Garska, 278 S.E.2d at
364. In reversing, the state supreme court rejected the best interest standard. Id. at 361-62. The
court said, "in the interest of removing the issue of child custody from the type of acrimonious
and counterproductive litigation which a procedure inviting exhaustive evidence will surely
create, we hold today that there is a presumption in favor of the primary caretaker parent...."
Id. at 362. To change the result, the supreme court changed the best interest standard by adding
a primary caretaker presumption. Id. at 362-63.
101 See Becker, supra note 87, at 182.
102 Id. at 173 (citing Gary Crippen, Stumbling Beyond Best Interests of the Child:
Reexamining Child Custody Standard-Setting in the Wake of Minnesota's Four Year
Experiment with the Primary Caretaker Preference, 75 MINN. L. REv. 427, 443-44 (1990)).
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the child nearby). The father may not have agreed to the mother having physical
custody if the mother had not agreed to remain nearby. By refusing to make the
mother honor her side of the bargain, the mother gets a windfall: she has the child
and she can relocate. The father loses. 10 3
To be fair, in this situation, the court should either re-litigate custody or
enforce the agreement. 0 4 Because re-litigating custody would not be desirable in
most situations, courts should enforce all terms of the agreement. Such a standard
would thus put the burden on parents to honor agreements, to negotiate changes
to them when necessary, and essentially to work together to develop workable
plans for themselves and their children.
Lastly, the best interest of the child standard has been perceived as gender-
biased. Women's rights advocates complain that the standard benefits men, while
fathers' rights groups allege that women are the ones benefited. 10 5 Regardless of
whether the standard favors fathers or mothers, a standard that is perceived to be
gender-biased will cause increased frustration and hostility at the process and the
judicial system.
Thus, under the best interest standard, litigation is encouraged because there
is no certainty. Uncertainty leads to an expensive, time-consuming, acrimonious
process that is perceived by many to be gender-biased. It leaves custody decisions
in the hands of judges with little guiding criteria and little appellate oversight.
Moreover, it promotes bad policy: parents are neither expected to make custody
decisions, nor honor agreements they make.
103 This example is based upon Zeller v. Zeller, 640 N.W.2d 53, 54-55 (N.D. 2002),
where the parents agreed to joint legal custody and to a provision automatically transferring
physical custody of the children from the mother to the father if the mother relocated. The trial
court enforced the agreement. The appellate court held, "a stipulated divorce provision for an
automatic change in custody upon the occurrence of a future event is unenforceable and the
district court retains control over the rights of children, regardless of any contrary agreements of
the divorcing parties." Id. at 58; accord, Parker v. Parker, 55 S.W.3d 773, 778-82 (Ark. Ct.
App. 2001) (refusing to enforce term in agreement that prevented wife from relocating).
104 See, e.g., In re Marriage of Arvin, 689 N.E.2d 1270, 1273 (id. Ct. App. 1997)
(holding that where mother never intended to honor covenant requiring her not to relocate, the
father could repudiate the parties' agreement giving the mother physical custody of the child).
105 Nancy D. Polikoff, Gender and Child Custody: Exploding the Myths, in FAMILIES,
POLITICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY: A FEMINIST DIALOGUE ON WOMEN AND THE STATE 185 (Irene
Diamond ed. 1983); see Case Comment, A Difference in Perceptions: The Final Report of the
North Dakota Commission on Gender Fairness in the Courts, 72 N.D. L. REv. 1113, 1178
(1996) (finding that mothers received primary physical custody in only 73% of the 99
unappealed divorce cases reviewed in North Dakota).
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B. The Presumption Standard
Because of its imperfections, some states added various presumptions, 10 6
including the parental agreement presumption, to the best interest standard. In
states using the presumption standard, judges must presume that a parental
agreement is in a child's best interest absent clear evidence that it is not. For
example in Kansas, a parental agreement is presumed to be in a child's best
interest; a court may make a different order only if it makes specific findings of
fact stating that the plan is not in the child's best interest.10 7 Similarly, in Georgia,
the court shall ratify a custody agreement "unless the court makes specific written
factual findings... that the agreement would not be in the best interests of the
child .... ,"108 And in Louisiana, "[i]f the parents agree who is to have custody,
the court shall award custody in accordance with their agreement unless the best
interest of the child requires a different award."'1 9 In New Jersey, "[t]he court
shall order any custody arrangement which is agreed to by both parents unless it
is contrary to the best interests of the child."1 10
The District of Columbia and Michigan restrain judges' discretion slightly
more. Judges in the District of Columbia must enter an order for custody as
agreed by the parents unless clear and convincing evidence indicates that the
arrangement is not in the best interest of the child.' 1 ' Similarly, in Michigan, if
parents agree to "parenting time terms, the court shall order the parenting time
terms unless the court determines on the record by clear and convincing evidence
that the parenting time terms are not in the best interests of the child."' "12
While new, the movement towards the presumption standard is far from
universal. In fact, many states presume the parents' agreement is in the child's
best interest only when the parents have agreed to joint custody. 1 3 In Mississippi,
10 6 For example, the joint custody presumption and the primary caretaker presumption
were presumptions added in different states to the best interest standard. See, e.g., Garska v.
McCoy, 278 S.E.2d 357 (W. Va. 1981) (adding the primary caretaker presumption).
10 7 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-1610(aX3)(A) (Supp. 2002).
108 GA. CODE ANN. § 19-9-5(b) (1994).
109 LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 132 (West 2003) (emphasis added).
110 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:2-4(d) (West 2002) (emphasis added); accord N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 50-13.1 (g) (2001) (directing the court to incorporate any agreement reached by the parents as
a result of mediation into the divorce order unless the court finds good reason not to).
111 D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-914(h) (2001 & Supp. 2003).
112 MICH. COMp. LAws § 722.27a(2) (2002) (emphasis added).
113 See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 3080 (West 1994) (presuming that joint custody is in the
best interest of a child where the parents have agreed to it); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-56a(b)
(1995) (presuming that joint custody is in the best interest of a child where the parents have
agreed to it); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/602.1(d)(1) (1999) (allowing the parties to determine the
physical residence of the child in joint custodial situations); IOWA CODE ANN. § 598.41(3), (4)
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for example, custody agreements that provide for joint custody are presumed to
be in a child's best interest.114 In contrast, custody agreements that provide for
sole custody are only incorporated into the judgment if "adequate and
sufficient."11 5 In Maine, judges must order joint custody when parents agree to it
unless there is substantial evidence that it should not be ordered. 116
Under the presumption standard, judges are still expected to reject a custody
agreement if they find that the agreement is not in the child's best interest. 117
Thus, while both the best interest standard and the presumption standard rest on
the best interest of the child, the degree of deference they give to parental
agreements is different. Under the best interest standard, courts "should" give
effect to parental agreements. Under the presumption standard, courts "shall" give
effect to parental agreements unless there is evidence to reject them. 18
1. Strengths of the Presumption Standard
The presumption standard gives greater weight to parental agreements than
the best interest standard. In that way, the presumption standard limits judicial
(West 2001) (stating that the best interest standard does not apply when parents agree to joint
custody); MINN. STAT. § 518.17(2Xd) (Supp. 2003) (requiring the court to use a rebuttable
presumption that, upon request of either or both parties, joint legal custody is in the best interest
of the child); Miss. CODE ANN. § 93-5-24(4) (1999 & Supp. 2003) (presuming that joint
custody is in the best interest of a child where the parents have agreed to it); NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 125.490(1) (1998) (presuming that joint custody is in the best interest of a child where the
parents have agreed to it); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 666(a) (2002) (presuming that joint custody
is in the best interest of a child where the parents have agreed to it). But see IND. CODE § 31-17-
2-15 (1999) ("the court shall consider it a matter of primary, but not determinative, importance
that the persons awarded joint custody have agreed to an award ofjoint legal custody"); NEB.
REV. STAT. § 42-364(5) (1999) (requiring the court to conduct a hearing in open court and
specifically find that joint custody is in the best interest of the child before awarding it even
when parents have agreed to joint custody); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 458:17 (l)(a) (1992)
(requiring the court to state in its decision, the reasons for the denying joint custody when the
parents agree to it); OKLA. STAT. tit. 43, § 109(D) (2001) (allowing the court to reject the
parents' request for joint custody when it is not in the child's best interest).
114 MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-5-24(4) (1999 & Supp. 2003).
115 Miss. CODE ANN. § 93-5-2(2) (1999).
116 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A, § 1653 (2)(A) (West 1998).
117 See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-56a(b) (1995) (presuming joint custody to be in
child's best interest where parents agree to it, but allowing court to refuse to award joint custody
and so long as the court states its reasons for doing so); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 666(a), (c)
(2002) (presuming joint custody is in the best interests of a child where the parents have agreed
to it, but allowing court to refuse to approve the agreement where it finds the agreement was not
in the child's best interest).
118 Like statutes that use the best interest standard, statutes that use the presumption
standard similarly do not distinguish between the various kinds of parental agreements;
prenuptial, postnuptial, and separation agreements.
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discretion more than the best interest standard. Uncertainty should decrease
somewhat. More importantly, litigation should also decrease and settlements
should increase because a judge would be required to enforce a custody
agreement unless it was shown that the agreement was not in the child's best
interest. With fewer cases proceeding to trial, acrimony should lessen.
2. Weaknesses of the Presumption Standard
But the presumption standard does not eliminate judicial discretion. Indeed,
judges are required to reject parental agreements that are not in children's best
interest. 19 Thus, like the best interest standard, judges would have the flexibility
to reject agreements made long before divorce when a parent could show that the
agreement is not currently in a child's best interest. Thus, the timing of the
agreement could very well affect its weight under this standard.
While judicial discretion would decrease, the decrease is not substantial. As
long as a judge could support the decision to reject the agreement with specific
findings, the parents' preferences would give way. Under the presumption
standard, judges are still able to set aside parental agreements simply because they
are not, in that judge's view, in the child's best interest.
Adding the parental agreement presumption to the best interest standard is
certainly an improvement. Yet, it is precisely because judges retain much of the
wide discretion they have under the best interest standard that adding this
presumption will not significantly improve the process. While judges would have
to support their decision not to enforce the custody agreement with specific
findings showing that the agreement is not in the child's best interest, judges have
been able to work around the best interest standard for years. 120 This presumption
will merely make judges work harder when they choose to reject a custody
agreement. Vague references to the best interest of a child will no longer be
sufficient to support a decision that ignores a custody agreement.
119 See statutes cited supra note 117.
120 For example, in Presley v. Presley, 989 S.W.2d 938 (Ark. Ct. App. 1999), the lower
court refused to modify custody when the father violated the court's order and allowed a female
guest to stay overnight while the children were present. The judge had earlier modified custody
from the mother to the father because the mother allowed a male guest to stay ovemight. Id. at
941 (Hart, J., dissenting). Additionally, there was evidence that the father left guns accessible to
the children. Id. The youngest child, age four, began talking about guns and threatened to blow
his grandfather's head off. Id. The children began swearing and lying while living with the
father. Id. In contrast, the chancellor complimented the mother on changing her lifestyle. Id.
The mother did everything the chancellor had required of her except pay child support. Id. The
court maintained custody with the father and the appellate court affirmed. The dissenting
female judge commented, "It is obvious that the chancellor imposed a different standard of
conduct on the parties.... The chancellor's finding that it is in the best interests of the child to
remain with their father is incredible based on the evidence presented." Id. at 941-42.
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C. The Parental Deference Standard
There is a third alternative that has been adopted in West Virginia: parental
deference. West Virginia's parental deference standard requires courts to enforce
the terms of any custody agreement, so long as it was voluntary and knowing and
absent harm to the child. 121
While the presumption standard allows judges to reject any agreement that is
not in children's best interest, the parental deference standard allows judges to
reject only those agreements that are actually harmful to children or were not
entered into voluntarily. Thus, judges would have much less discretion to reject
parental agreements.
Adopting a parental deference standard for all parental agreements appears
contrary to children's best interest. For example, when parents make custody
agreements before they have children or before they divorce, they are unable to
make plans that take into account the unique and special needs of their particular
child at that particular time. Especially if made before they have children, these
agreements may not reflect parents' beliefs at divorce regarding what is best for
their children. These parents may truly believe that they would want a specific
custody arrangement. After having children and realizing the enormous physical,
emotional, and professional sacrifices children require of their parents, and
realizing the intense rewards and satisfactions of being a parent, some parents
might change their minds. If they then fail to renegotiate the parenting agreement,
the old agreement may not reflect what they believe to be in their child's best
interest at the time of divorce. Under a parental deference standard, it would be
irrelevant if one parent no longer believed the agreement to be in their child's best
interest. The agreement would control. Thus, it is tempting to find such a standard
not protective enough of children because agreements that at least one parent no
longer likes will be enforced. But, as discussed below, this standard is protective
because custody decisions under this standard will better meet children's needs
and the custody process will improve.
121 See, e.g., W. VA. CODE § 48-9-201 (2001) (requiring the court to order parental
custody arrangement as agreed to by the parents unless the agreement is not knowing, not
voluntary, or would be harmful to the child). Oregon adopted an even stricter standard for joint
custody. Judges "may not overrule [joint custody] agreement[s] by ordering sole custody to one
parent." OR. REV. STAT. § 107.169(4) (2001). Unlike West Virginia's statute, there is no harm
override: according to the statutory language, when parents agree to joint custody, judges
cannot reject the parents' agreement even if a child would be harmed under it.
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1. Strengths of the Parental Deference Standard
a. The Parental Deference Standard Will Lead to Better Decisions
The parental deference standard will lead to better custody arrangements
because parents will be making the decision. When parents make custody
decisions during the divorce process, it is easy to see that the parents are in a
better position to be making these determinations than judges. "[G]enerally, there
is no person, including any trial or appellate judge who is better able to evaluate
the persons best suited to be a guardian for a child than the child's parents."'122
Parents alone know the unique needs of their children and the ability of both
themselves and their spouse to parent. Better decisions are possible from parents
because a judge does not know the child the way the parents do. When parents act
together to make agreements, children benefit. 123
It is, perhaps, harder to see that when agreements are made prior to the
divorce process, the parents will still make better decisions than judges. But the
state is generally willing to let parents make parenting decisions without
interference when the parents are not divorcing because it is assumed that they
will make good decisions. 124 Parents alone know the unique needs and desires of
their child and their own abilities and interests. 125 The state, in contrast, would
function poorly as a parent.
Traditionally, judges refused to enforce parental agreements because these
same knowledgeable parents could not be trusted to make good decisions at
divorce. At divorce, parents would be more inclined to act selfishly and
antagonistically, leading them to prioritize their own needs over those of their
children. 126 The courts expected divorcing parents to make decisions based on
their desire to hurt the other parent rather than to do what was best for their
child. 127 For example, in the only custody case to reach the Supreme Court, the
Court stated, "Unfortunately, experience has shown that the question of custody,
so vital to a child's happiness and well-being, frequently cannot be left to the
122 Stills v. Johnson, 533 S.E.2d 695, 703 (Ga. 2000).
123 See, e.g., Neu v. Neu, 756 N.Y.S.2d 598, 599 (N.Y. App. Div. 2003) ("[W]imesses
testifying at the hearing unanimously agreed that both the child's performance in school and his
ability to cope with the fiustrations caused by the parents' separation had improved since the
parties agreed on a new custody arrangement approximately five months before the mother
filed her petition [to modify custody].").
124 Spitko, supra note 1, at 1198 (citing Stephen G. Gilles, On Educating Children: A
Paternalist Manifesto, 63 U. CHI. L. REv. 937, 953-55 (1996)).
125 Id. at 1199.
126 Id. at 1201.
127 Id. at 1202.
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discretion of parents."'1 28 When parents are divorcing, judges fear that children
will be harmed by their parents' decisions. Thus, traditionally, judges justified
judicial oversight of custody decisions during divorce because the parents were
expected to act out of their own self-interest and their desire to hurt the other
parent rather than from concern about the best interest of their child.
Today, legislatures recognize that during divorce parents can put aside their
differences and work together to determine what will work best for their children.
Indeed, states expect divorcing parents to determine jointly the day-to-day
arrangements for raising their children after divorce, such as attending to the
child's educational needs. 129 In this country, parenting plans130 are the norm in
128 Ford v. Ford, 371 U.S. 187, 193 (1962).
129 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 30-3-153 (2003) ("In order to implement joint custody, the
court shall require the parents to submit, as part of their agreement, provisions covering matters
relevant to the care and custody of the child ... ."); ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 25-403(F), (1) (2001)
(before awarding joint custody, the parents must submit a proposed parenting plan that
addresses, among other things, a schedule for the physical residence of the child); COLO. REv.
STAT. § 14-10-124(7) (2002) ("both parties may submit a parenting plan... that shall address
both parenting time and the allocation of decision-making responsibilities."); 750 ILL. COMP.
STAT. 750/5-602.1(b) (1999) ("In [joint) custody cases, the court shall initially request the
parents to produce a Joint Parenting Agreement...."); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 208, § 31 (1994)
("if the issue of custody is contested and either party seeks shared legal or physical custody, the
parties, jointly or individually, shall submit to the court at the trial a shared custody
implementation plan setting forth the details of shared custody..."); Mo. REV. STAT.
§ 452.375 (9) (2003) ("Any judgment providing for custody shall include a specific written
parenting plan .... [enforcement of which] shall be in the court's discretion and shall be in the
best interest of the child."); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-234(1) (1999) (requiring parents to
submit a parenting plan for every divorce proceeding involving children); NEB. REv. STAT.
§ 43-2917 (1999) ("When the parenting plan is agreed to by both parties... [t]he court may,
after a hearing and based on the best interests of the minor child, approve... or reject the
plan...."); NEV. REv. STAT. 125.520 (1) (1998) ("The court may, when appropriate, require
the parents to submit to the court a plan for carrying out the court's order concerning custody.");
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-4-9.1(F) (Michie 2003) ("When joint custody is awarded, the court shall
approve a parenting plan for the implementation of the prospective custody arrangement prior
to the award ofjoint custody."); Oino REv. CODE ANN. § 3109.04(G) (Anderson 2000 & Supp.
2003) (requiring parents to file "a plan for the exercise of shared parenting" if requesting joint
custody); OKLA. STAT. tit. 43, § 109(C) (2003) ("If either or both parents have requested joint
custody, said parents shall file with the court their plans for the exercise of joint care, custody,
and control of their child ... "); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5306 (2003) ("The court, in its
discretion, may require the parents to submit to the court a plan for the implementation of any
custody order made under this subchapter."); WASH. REv. CODE § 26.09.181(1) (1997) ("each
party shall file and serve a proposed permanent parenting plan...").
130 Parenting plans are plans developed during divorce. Some states allow parents to
address custody in such plans. See, e.g., W. VA. CODE ANN. § 48-1-235.4 (West 2003). Other
states require parents to include only "those aspects of the parent-child relationship in which the
parent makes decisions and performs functions necessary for the care and growth of the child,
[such as] ... attending to adequate education for the child,... [and] ensuring the interactions
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custody litigation rather than the exception. Courts expect parents to decide
together what their children need. This parenting plan is then incorporated into the
divorce decree. 131 Thus, judicial deference to parental decisions, far from radical,
is actually the norm in existing law because parents, rather than judges, know
what is best for their children.
Also, given the assumption that parents will act selfishly and antagonistically
during divorce, judicial reluctance to enforce agreements made prior to divorce
makes little sense. These agreements are made before the parents enter into the
acrimony of divorce. Rather than acting out of self-interest, the parents are acting
together to formulate a future plan for their children 132 and themselves that seems
appropriate to them at that time. Parents' interests are generally aligned with those
of their children prior to divorce. 133 Arguably, judicial hostility toward custody
agreements should actually decrease when these agreements are made before
divorce.
b. The Parental Deference Standard Will Improve the Custody Process
The parental deference standard will not only lead to better decisions, but also
improve the child custody process. If courts were required to defer to custody
agreements absent harm to the child, the custody process would improve
dramatically. Child custody litigation itself is harmful to all involved. "[H]earings
do not enhance justice, particularly since custody fights are highly destructive to
the emotional health of children."' 134 "[A] domestic relations proceeding in and of
itself can constitute state intervention that is so disruptive of the parent-child
relationship that the constitutional right of a custodial parent to make certain basic
determinations for the child's welfare becomes implicated .... and constitutional
protection may be required."'135 Whatever standard is used for custody
agreements, litigation must be curtailed. Of all the parental agreement standards,
and interrelationship of the child with the child's parents and siblings .. " MONT. CODE ANN.
§ 40-4-234(1) (1999).
131 Compare WASH. REV. CODE § 26.09.004(2) (1997) ("[The] [p]ermanent parenting
plan... is incorporated in any final decree ...."); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-234(1) (1999);
with NEB. REv. STAT. § 43-2903(3) (2003) ("[The] [p]arenting plan... may be incorporated
into any final decree .... ).
132 Even when parents make these agreements before they have children, parents know
themselves and their partners better than judges do.
133 Scott & Scott, supra note 21, at 1323.
134 Garska v. McCoy, 278 S.E.2d 357, 361 (1981).
135 Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 101 (2000) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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the parental deference standard most significantly reduces litigation while
simultaneously protecting children.136
As discussed earlier, under either the best interest standard or the presumption
standard, judges retain discretion to reject the parents' agreements. 137 Thus,
certainty is absent and litigation is likely. Under the parental deference standard,
very few parental agreements would need to be litigated. Only those rare
instances when a parent could demonstrate that the custody agreement would
harm the child, 138 such as child or spousal abuse, and those even rarer cases when
one parent could show that the other was unfit. Certainty would be almost
assured. Litigation would decrease substantially because the parties could
anticipate the result. Fewer appeals would be taken because fewer cases would be
heard at the trial level. Because fewer cases would be heard, acrimony would
generally decrease. 139 Whenever the amount of custody litigation is lessened,
children benefit.
In addition, the appellate process is so lengthy that often a "wrong" decision
becomes "right." When a trial court awards custody to the "wrong" parent under
the best interests standard, the "right" parent appeals. The appellate court then
concludes that the trial court erred. The case is remanded to the trial court to begin
the process anew. Yet despite making a bad decision initially, the trial court will
maintain custody with the "wrong" parent because the child has been living with
the parent through the trial and appellate process. 140 Changing custody, even
136 Compare Oregon's strict standard for joint custody. Judges "may not overrule [joint
custody] agreement[s] by ordering sole custody to one parent." OR. REV. STAT. § 107.169(4)
(2001). According to the statutory language, there is no harm override, thus no protection to
children at all.
137 See discussion infra Parts III (A) & (B).
138 An example of a case in which enforcing the parents' agreement would be harmful to
the child is Santoro v. Santoro, 638 N.Y.S.2d 478 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996). In this case, the
parents agreed that the mother would have custody of the daughter and the father would have
custody of the son. The father petitioned to modify custody when the mother "engaged in a
persistent effort to prevent [the daughter] from seeing and being with the father and her brother.
For almost six months the wife permitted no visitation whatsoever.., the evidence indicates
that [the daughter] and her brother had a close sibling relationship and that the [agreed upon
arrangement was] traumatic and harmful to [the daughter]." Id. at 480.
139 However, those cases that did make it to litigation would likely be very acrimonious,
because the stigma of being harmful to one's child would be a difficult label for any parent to
bear.
140 See, e.g., Moorehead v. Moorehead, 602 N.Y.S.2d 403 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993), appeal
dismissed, 632 N.E.2d 456 (N.Y. 1994). In this case, the father refused to pay child support as
ordered and regularly canceled visitation. Id. at 406 (Miller, J., dissenting). At her financial and
emotional "wits' end," the mother took the children to the father's house and demanded that he
take some responsibility for the children. Id. He refused to accept the children unless she signed
an agreement giving the father custody; she did. Id. The following day, the father refused to
return the children. Although the mother indicated that she had no intention of giving up
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when the other parent should have had custody initially, is not in the child's best
interest once years have gone by and a bond has developed between the child and
the "wrong" parent. 141
Adopting the parental deference standard will limit the number of appeals.
But this phenomenon demonstrates another point: namely, that a decision that is
not in the child's best interest at the time it is made, may later become a decision
in the child's best interest. In other words, there are no perfect decisions, just
decisions that may be better at a particular time. A standard that seeks perfect
decision-making at the expense of a tolerable process harms children.
Additionally, enforcing the parents' agreement would benefit parents. When
parents avoid the courtroom they minimize the transaction costs involved in
adjudication. 142 They avoid the risk and uncertainty of litigation. 43 They also
have incentive to negotiate agreements that better reflect their individual
preferences, 144 because they can expect their agreements to be honored. Parents,
not judges, would be deciding the fate of their children in almost every case.
Because the court would be enforcing an agreement the parties developed
themselves, parents would be more likely to stay involved with their children after
custody and had only signed the agreement under duress, the appellate court affirmed the lower
court's decision to change custody from the mother to the father because the children were with
the father during the 2 2 year appellate process. "If the 1991 de facto transfer of custody had
been accomplished improperly, by kidnapping or 'self-help', for example, then there might be
valid social reasons for discounting the importance which would otherwise ascribe to the
maintenance of stability in the child's life." Id, at 405. Cf Hefer v. Hefer, 667 N.E.2d 1094,
1098 (Ill. Ct. App. 1996) ("Where there has been a lengthy period of temporary custody, the
case may be more like a petition to modify custody than like an initial award of
custody.... The parent who wishes to contest custody should be required to do so at the earliest
possible time."); Johns v. Johns, 549 N.Y.S.2d 200, 202 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989) ("[t]he previous
caretaking arrangement, whether the product of litigation or mutual consent, is to be accorded
priority" in a best interest analysis); Hansen v. Hansen, 736 P.2d 1055, 1057 (Utah Ct. App.
1987) (considering where and with whom the child is living during the pendency of the divorce
is relevant to a custody determination).
141 See e.g., Sorentino v. Family and Children's Soc'y. of Elizabeth, 367 A.2d 1168, 1171
(N.J. 1976) (holding that where state wrongfully refused to return child to fit parents, parents
would have burden of proving that moving child from foster placement would not cause serious
psychological harm to the child), afl'd after remand, 378 A.2d 18 (N.J. 1977) (affirming trial
court's award of child to foster parents after remand); see also Pennsylvania ex. rel. Bankert v.
Children's Serv., 307 A.2d 411, 414 (Pa. 1973). "Of extreme significance [in the best interests
of the child] is the fact that Charlene has been in the care and custody of [the foster parents]
throughout her development from an infant of three weeks to a child of nine years. After such a
period of time ... ." Id. "[The] bonds of affection have become so strong that to sunder them
suddenly may result not only in the child's unhappiness, but also in its [sic] physical
injury .... ."Id.
142 DIVIDING THE CIULD, supra note 4, at 55.
143 Id.
144 Id.
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divorce.14 5 No longer would one parent feel wrongly excluded from his or her
children's lives. Likely, compliance with visitation and child support orders
would increase as well. 14
6
Finally, such a standard is workable. Divorcing parents can decide the
custody of their children without acrimony.147 In fact, divorcing parents should be
deciding their children's custody. In a study of divorcing parents in California,
researchers found that "nearly three-fourths of the families in our sample
experienced little, if any, conflict over the custody and visitation terms." 148 For
those parents who argued over custody, most were able to resolve their
disagreements through mediation or court ordered-evaluation. 14 9 Only a handful,
less than 2%, required formal adjudication. 150 Thus, parents can and do make
good custody decisions even during discord. 151 And when they cannot make the
decision alone, mediation and arbitration are viable alternatives to help the parents
decide. A judge should be the last resort.
145 Fathers who have little contact with children after divorce have a much lower child
support compliance rate than fathers who have regular overnight visits with their children.
DIVIDING THE CHILD, supra note 4, at 252-53.
146 According to a study of 1,100 divorcing families in California, 15 to 30% of the
families made post-divorce modifications to the divorce decree. Eighty percent of these
modifications were negotiated and adopted informally by the parents, rather than through the
legal system. The child support compliance rate for re-negotiated agreements was 76%,
compared to 71% for an overall average. DIVIDING THE CHILD, supra note 4, at 256. "The fact
that some parents increased the amount of child support paid as family circumstances changed,
while others decreased the amount, indicates that some proportion of divorced couples regard
their agreement as a flexible one." Id. at 264.
147 In 80% of the cases studied, the parents' request for custody did not conflict at the time
the divorce was filed. Of these 705 cases, the judge awarded custody as requested in the
petitions in 571 cases. In 134 of these cases, however, the decree provided for some other
custodial arrangement. But the paperwork filed with the court in these cases did not show any
parental conflict. Thus, the parents negotiated a different agreement during the divorce process.
Typically, a divorce decree is issued more than a year after parties file for divorce. It is possible
that family circumstances changed in some of these cases and the parents took these changes
into consideration. DIVIDING THE CHILD, supra note 4, at 103.
148 Robert H. Mnookin & Eleanor Maccoby, Facing the Dilemmas of Child Custody, 10
VA. J. Soc. POL'Y & L. 54, 60 (2002).
149 Id.
150 Id. Only a total of 4% even went to trial at all. See also DIVIDING THE CHILD, supra
note 4, at 137 (citing the statistical data for this study).
151 ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 18, § 2.06 cmt. a (supporting its adoption of the parental
deference standard by claiming that agreements made during divorce are likely to be in
children's best interest).
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c. The Parental Deference Standard Furthers Parents'Fundamental Right
to Make Parenting Decisions
A standard that fails to allow fit parents the right to make decisions regarding
the custody of their children raises constitutional concerns. When parents are not
divorcing, the state has shown great reluctance to intrude on the autonomy of the
parent-child relationship for two reasons: first, state intervention is rarely
productive, and second, the Supreme Court has recognized that parents have a
fundamental right to raise their children without state involvement. 152
The state's principal goal in regulating the parent-child relationship is to
ensure that parents will raise physically and emotionally healthy adults capable of
becoming productive members of society. 153 So long as a parent is adequately
caring for a child, there should be no reason for a state to intrude into that parent's
child-rearing decisions, regardless of whether the parent is married. The "natural
bonds of affection lead parents to act in the best interests of their children."'154
The Supreme Court has not specifically addressed the issue of whether
parental custody agreements are constitutionally protected. 155 But the Supreme
Court has recognized a constitutional right grounded in the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment to raise one's children free from state interference. 156
While the right clearly exists, the scope of that right and the standard for
reviewing state interference with that right are far from clear.
In the early 1920s, the Supreme Court first identified this right in Meyer v.
Nebraska.157 In Meyer, the Court struck down a state statute that criminalized
teaching in any language other than English. 158 The Court held that the statute
152 Spitko, supra note 1, at 1155.
153 Id. at 1179 (citing Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert E. Scott, Parents as Fiduciaries, 81 VA.
L. REv. 2401, 2405-19 (1995) (discussing the societal goals at stake in regulating the parent-
child relationship)).
154 Parham v. J. R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979) (holding that the presumption that parents
act in the best interests of their child should apply when parents commit their children to a state
mental hospital).
155 Indeed, the Court has not even addressed the issue of the proper standard for custody
litigation. But cf Ford v. Ford, 371 U.S. 187, 193-94 (1962) (holding that the Federal Full
Faith and Credit Clause does not prohibit South Carolina from reviewing a Virginia custody
order based on the parties' agreement because Virginia did not treat custody agreements as
contracts).
156 See generally Francis Barry McCarthy, The Confused Constitutional Status and
Meaning of Parental Rights, 22 GA. L. REV. 975, 980-92 (1988) (concluding that whether
parental autonomy is a fundamental right is unclear from court precedent).
157 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
158 Id. at 400.
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violated the parents' constitutional right to educate their children.159 The Court
determined that the Due Process Clause protected a parent's fundamental right to
raise a child without unnecessary state interference. "[T]hose who nurture him
and direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and
prepare him for additional obligations." 160
The first case to uphold state interference with this right was Prince v.
Massachusetts.16 1 In that case, a mother claimed that a child labor law violated
her right to free exercise of religion and to parental autonomy. 162 Ms. Prince was
convicted of violating the law after she repeatedly furnished religious magazines
to her child, who then sold them on the streets. 163 The Court upheld the
conviction. Prince was subsequently credited with developing the harm standard:
the state may interfere with parental autonomy whenever "harm to the physical or
mental health of the child or to the public safety, peace, order or welfare has been
demonstrated or may be properly inferred."164
During the next fifty years, the Supreme Court further delineated this right. In
Moore v. City of East Cleveland,16 5 the Court "acknowledged a 'private realm of
family life.' ",166 When the State intrudes on this right, the Court "must examine
carefully the importance of the governmental interests advanced and the extent to
which they are served by the challenged regulation."' 167 And in Wisconsin v.
Yoder, the Court stated, the "primary role of the parents in the upbringing of their
children is now established beyond debate as an enduring American tradition."' 168
While these cases identified this right, they did not clearly define its parameters.
159 Id. at 401.
160 Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925) (invalidating, under the due
process clause, a state statute requiring parents to send their children to public school).
161 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
162 Id. at 164.
163 Id. at 159-661.
164 Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 230 (1972). In Yoder, the Court invalidated a state
statute that required parents to send their children to public or private school until age sixteen.
The parents in Yoder were Amish and refused to send their children to school for religious
reasons. The Court concluded that "more than merely a 'reasonable relation to some purpose
within the competency of the State' is required to sustain the validity of the State's requirement
under the First Amendment." Id. at 233. Unlike parental agreements, the statute at issue in this
case included a free exercise claim.
165 431 U.S. 494 (1977). In Moore, the Court invalidated a state zoning statute that limited
the occupancy of a single family home to members of a single family. Id. at 506.
166 Id. at 499 (quoting Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944)).
167 Id. (citing Poe. v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 554 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting)).
168 Yoder, 406 U.S. at 232; see also Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 450 (1990)
(invalidating a proposed abortion statute that required both parents to be notified of a child's
decision to have an abortion because "the requirement that both parents be notified, whether or
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In 1982, the Court decided a parental termination case from New York. 169 A
New York statute allowed the state to terminate parental rights upon a showing
that the child was" 'permanently neglected.' "170 Under New York law, the state
needed only to meet its burden by a "'fair preponderance of the evidence.'"171
The appellate court upheld a termination under this statute.' 72 New York's
highest court dismissed the parents' appeal. 173 The United States Supreme Court
reversed. It held that "the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
demands... that the State support its allegations by at least clear and convincing
evidence."1 74
According to the Court, a higher standard is required when the individual
interest at stake is more substantial than mere loss of money, such as the loss of
one's child. 175 The Court also said that the clear and convincing evidence
standard would further the state's two competing interests--"a parens patriae
interest in preserving and promoting the welfare of the child and a fiscal and
administrative interest in reducing the cost and burden of court proceedings"--
while simultaneously protecting the parents' interest in preserving the familial
bonds.176
The most recent case to be decided in this area, Troxel v. Granville,177 offers
the most insight into this constitutional doctrine. In Troxel, the Court invalidated a
Washington statute that allowed any person to petition for visitation with any
child at any time so long as it was in the child's best interest. 178 This statute gave
trial courts the ability to order visitation with anyone, over the objection of the
not both wish to be notified or have assumed responsibility for the upbringing of the child, does
not reasonably further any legitimate state interest."); Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753
(1982) (holding that when a state terminates parental fights, due process requires that the state
support its allegations by at least clear and convincing evidence); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S.
645, 649 (1972) (holding that the Due Process Clause prohibits presumptions that parents are
unfit and requires a hearing before children can be taken away). But cf Quilloin v. Walcott, 434
U.S. 246, 255 (1978) (holding that an unwed, but fit father's fundamental right was not violated
when the state allowed the mother's husband to adopt a child over the father's objection).
169 Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982).
170 Id. at 747 (citing N.Y. Soc. SERv. LAw §§ 384-b4(d), 7(a) (McKinney Supp. 1981-
82)).
171 Id. (citing N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 622 (McKinney 1975 & Supp. 1981-82)).
172 Id. at 752.
173 Id.
174 Id. at 747-48 (emphasis added).
175 Santosky, 455 U.S. at 756.
176 Id. at 766.
177 530 U.S. 57 (2000).
178 Id. at 75.
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parent, when the court determined that visitation would be in the child's best
interest. 179
In Troxel, the paternal grandparents petitioned the court after their son died
and the mother decided to decrease their visitation. 180 Finding the visitation to be
in the children's best interest, the trial court awarded the visitation over the
mother's objections.181 The Washington supreme court reversed, reasoning that
the Federal Constitution permitted the state to intervene only to prevent a present
or future harm to the child.182 The grandparents appealed to the United States
Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court was divided and issued a plurality opinion with
numerous concurrences and dissents. Even so, each justice recognized that
parents have a fundamental liberty interest in the care, custody, and control of
their children. 183 With the exception of Justice Scalia, 184 the members of the
Court believe that parental autonomy "is perhaps the oldest of the fundamental
liberty interests" and entitled to some heightened constitutional protection.18 5
The appropriate level of protection is less clear. The plurality opinion refused
to decide whether harm to the child is needed to justify state interference with
parental decision-making.186 But the Court rejected the statute's standard: that the
179 Id. at 61 (citing WASH. REV. CODE § 26.10.160(3) (West 1994)).
180 530 U.S. at 61.
181 Id. at 61-62. The trial court opinion shows the problems with the best interest
standard. Because the trial judge fondly remembered his summer vacations with his
grandparents, he found the visitation to be in the child's best interest. Id. at 72." 'I look back on
some personal experiences ....'" Id. "'We always spen[t] as kids a week with one set of
grandparents and another set of grandparents, [and] it happened to work out in our family that
[it] turned out to be an enjoyable experience. Maybe that can, in this family, if that is how it
works out.' "Id.
182 Id. at 63 (citing In re Custody of Smith, 969 P.2d 21, 28-30 (Wash. 1998)).
183 The plurality, Justices O'Connor, Rhenquist, Ginsburg, and Breyer, agreed that there is
a "fundamental right to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of [children]."
Troxel, 530 U.S. at 72. Similarly, Justice Souter stated, "We have long recognized that a
parent's interests in the nurture, upbringing, companionship, care, and custody of children are
generally protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. at 77
(Souter, J., dissenting). And, according to Justice Kennedy, "the custodial parent has a
constitutional right to determine, without undue interference by the state, how best to raise,
nurture, and educate the child." Id. at 95 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia recognized that
the current Court precedent provides for this fundamental right but does not agree with these
decisions. Id. at 92-93 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
184 Id. at 91-93 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
185 Id. at65.
181 Id. at 73 ("[W]e do not consider the primary constitutional question passed on by the
Washington Supreme Court-whether the Due Process Clause requires all nonparental
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state could intervene simply when it was in the child's best interest. According to
the Court, the best interest standard did not sufficiently protect parental autonomy
because it placed the "determination solely in the hands of the judge."'187 The
Court noted that under the best interest standard, when a judge simply disagreed
with the parent, the judge's view would prevail. 188 For example, Troxel
"involve[d] nothing more than a simple disagreement between the Washington
Superior Court and [the mother] concerning her children's best interests. '189
Thus, the plurality opinion held that the best interest standard is not sufficiently
protective of parental autonomy, at least in third party visitation situations.
More importantly, the plurality opinion was very clear that states must defer
to fit parental decisions. As long as a parent is fit, the state should have no reason
to inject itself into the family to question that parent's childrearing decisions.190
"[I]f a fit parent's decision.., becomes subject to judicial review, the court must
accord at least some special weight to the parent's own determination." 191 In
Troxel, the trial court failed to give the mother's decision any weight and instead
presumed that her decision was not in the best interest of the child. 192 This
presumption directly contradicted the traditional presumption that fit parents act
in their children's best interest. 193 Thus, the Court held that the decision was not
sufficiently protective of a parent's fundamental right.
Troxel thus stands for two propositions: the best interest standard alone does
not sufficiently protect parental autonomy, and fit parental decisions require
deference. Because parents have a constitutional right to raise their children and
make decisions regarding their care and custody, a state should not be able to
override that decision absent a compelling interest. 194 The state has a compelling
visitation statutes to include a showing of harm or potential harm to the child as a condition
precedent to granting visitation.").
187 Id. at67.
188 Troxel, 530 U.S. at 67.
189 Id. at 72.
190 Id. at 68-69.
19 1 Id. at 70.
192Id. at 69; accord Heltzel v. Heltzel, 638 N.W.2d 123, 136 (Mich. Ct. App. 2001)
(holding that requiring mother to prove that changing child's custody from the grandparents to
herself would be in child's best interest violated mother's fundamental right to raise her child).
193 Troxel, 530 U.S. at 69.
194 Accord Lamb v. Wenning, 591 N.E.2d 1031, 1033 (id. Ct. App. 1992) ("[U]nder rare
circumstances, the divorce court may properly refuse to approve a couple's agreement to joint
legal custody where.., the parents had made child rearing itself a battleground."); Stills v.
Johnson, 533 S.E.2d 695, 702-03 (Ga. 2000) (" '[T]he right to the custody and control of one's
child is a fiercely guarded right in our society and in our law. It is a right that should be
infringed upon only under the most compelling circumstances.' ") (citation omitted). The
Supreme Court of Georgia held that the state may impose visitation only over a parent's
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interest in protecting children from psychological, physical, or emotional harm. 195
Additionally, the state has a compelling interest to protect children from abuse or
neglect.196 But the state does not have a compelling interest in protecting children
from the bad decisions of their parents. 197 "The fundamental liberty interest of
natural parents in the care, custody, and management of their child does not
evaporate simply because they have not been model parents ... ,198
During marriage, states cannot override a parent's decision even if it is clearly
not in a child's best interest. States expect parents to act in their children's best
interest,199 but cannot constitutionally intervene in the family whenever bad
parenting decisions are made. For example, eating fast food is not in children's
best interest.200 Similarly, watching violent television is not in children's best
interests.20 1 However, the state cannot constitutionally intervene. Only when the
level of harm reaches neglect standards is state interference constitutionally
allowed. "That some parents 'may at times be acting against the interests of their
children'... creates a basis for caution, but is hardly a reason to discard
wholesale those pages of human experience that teach that parents generally do
act in the child's best interests. '202
objection when failing to do so would be harmful to the child. Brooks v. Parkerson, 454 S.E.2d
769 (Ga. 1995).
195 Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 109 (1990) ("It is evident beyond the need for
elaboration that a State's interest in 'safeguarding the physical and psychological well-being of
a minor is 'compelling' .... " (citing New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 756-58 (1982)));
Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 603 (1979) ("[A] state is not without constitutional control over
parental discretion in dealing with children when their physical or mental health is
jeopardized.").
196 Cf Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 747-48 (1982) (holding that when a state
terminates parental rights, due process requires that the state support its allegations by at least
clear and convincing evidence).
197 "Simply because the decision of a parent is not agreeable to a child or because it
involves risks does not automatically transfer the power to make that decision from the parents
to some agency or officer of the state." Parham, 442 U.S. at 603. Accord Meyer v. Nebraska,
262 U.S. 390 (1923); Pierce v. Soc'y. of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Prince v. Massachusetts,
321 U.S. 158 (1944); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497
U.S. 417 (1990). "The statist notion that governmental power should supersede parental
authority in all cases because some parents abuse and neglect children is repugnant to American
tradition." Parham, 442 U.S. at 603.
198 Stantosky, 455 U.S. at 753.
199 Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 69 (2000).
200 See Pelman v. McDonald's Corp., 237 F. Supp. 2d 512, 532 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) ("It is
well-known that fast food in general, and McDonalds' products in particular, contain high levels
of cholesterol, fat, salt, and sugar, and that such attributes are bad for one.").
201 See generally John P. Murray, The Impact of Televised Violence, 22 HOFSTRA L. REV.
809, 822 (1994).
202 Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602-03 (1979) (citations omitted).
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Parents have a fundamental right to make parenting decisions during
marriage, even bad decisions. Assuming parents are fit, it makes no sense that
they would lose the right to make decisions for their children solely because they
divorce. 203 Thus, statutes that permit judges to reject parental agreements solely
because the agreement is not in the child's best interest implicate the parents'
fundamental right. Such statutes allow judges to replace the parents' decision with
their own whenever a judge disagrees with the parent, but without a compelling
reason.204 Many of these statutes do not even require the judge to explain on the
record why the parental agreement was rejected.205 Moreover, these statutes do
not require judges to defer to fit parental decisions. Instead, parental agreements
are accorded no more weight than the other best interest factors. Thus, states
using the best interest standard fail to recognize that fit parents have a
fundamental right to make custody decisions, and the state must afford them some
deference absent a compelling interest to interfere. As such, these statutes are
likely unconstitutional.
Similarly, the parental presumption standard also raises constitutional
concerns. Under this standard, judges presume that parental agreements are in the
best interest of the child, but must reject agreements that are not.206 Unlike the
best interest standard, this standard gives more weight to parental agreements.
However, like the best interest standard, the presumption standard requires judges
to reject parental agreements whenever the judge determines that the agreement is
not in the child's best interest.207 In other words, when the judge disagrees with
the parents' decision, the judge can replace the parents' decision with his or her
own. Because the standard does not require judges to have a compelling enough
interest before they reject the parents' agreement, it is not protective enough of the
parents' fundamental right.
In this regard, statutes with a presumption standard are similar to the statute
that the Court held unconstitutional in Troxel. In Troxel, the statute allowed a
judge to award visitation over a fit parent's objection so long as it was in a child's
best interest.208 Similarly, the presumption standard allows a judge to reject a
parental agreement over two fit parents' objections whenever the agreement is not
in a child's best interest. In Troxel, the Supreme Court held that this standard was
203 See Holly L. Robinson, Joint Custody: Constitutional Imperatives, 54 U. CIN. L. REV.
27, 29 (1985) (arguing that parents have a constitutional right to joint custody absent a showing
of harm to child).
204 Lamb v. Wenning, 591 N.E.2d 1031, 1033 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992) ("The judiciary must
be extremely reluctant to substitute its judgment for that of parents in the area of raising
children.").
205 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.183(2) (West 1997).
206 See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 19-9-5(b) (1999).
20O7 Id.
208 Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 5 7, 60 (2000).
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not sufficiently protective of the parents' fundamental right.209 Thus, both the best
interest standard and the presumption standard fail to respect fit parents'
decisions, fail to protect parental autonomy, and would likely not survive
constitutional challenge.
Only the parental deference standard sufficiently protects parental autonomy.
This standard requires judges to award custody in accordance with the parental
agreement unless doing so would cause harm to the child. Harm might be defmed
as follows: abusing or neglecting a child; being substantially unable to perform
normal parenting functions; having a long-term emotional or physical impairment
that interferes with the parent's ability to perform parenting functions; acting in
any way that would damage the child's psychological development; withholding
access to the child from the other parent or sibling(s) for a protracted period
without good cause; and abusing one's spouse.210 The parental deference
standard respects the decisions of fit parents while simultaneously protecting
children from harm. It prevents judges from substituting their decisions for the
parents', while protecting children from harmful custody arrangements. Because
it protects the state's parens patriae role, respects parental autonomy, and reduces
the costs and burdens of custody proceedings, this standard would raise few, if
any, constitutional concerns.
Although only one jurisdiction has adopted this standard, the ALI
recommended the parental deference standard for parental agreements made
during divorce.211 The ALI concluded that a court must enforce a separation
agreement unless voluntary consent by one of the parties was lacking or the
agreement would be harmful to the child.212 In adopting this standard for
separation agreements, the ALI did not cite constitutional concerns. Rather, the
ALI concluded that agreements made during divorce are likely to be in children's
best interests, especially compared to a plan ordered by the court over the parents'
objections. 213
However, the ALI mistakenly endorsed another standard for prenuptial and
postnuptial parental agreements. The ALI rejected the parental deference standard
for agreements made prior to divorce and recommended the best interest
2o9 Id. at 67.
210 See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.09.191(3) (West 1997) (allowing court to limit
provisions in a parenting plan if any of the identified factors exist).
211 The goal of the ALI was to "achieve greater determinacy in family law while
preserving the autonomy of partners and parents to make their own decisions about the terms
under which relationships, entered into as if permanent, are dissolved." Katharine T. Bartlett,
US. Custody Law and Trends in the Context of the ALI Principles of the Law of Family
Dissolution, 10 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 5, 6 (2002) (The Family Dissolution project began in
1989 and was completed in 2002.).
212 ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 18, § 2.06.
2 13 Id. § 2.06 cmt. a.
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standard.2 14 The ALl justified its choice of the less differential standard on the fact
that "adults on the brink of marriage can be expected to be limited in their ability
to evaluate their child's needs, judge the other parent's ability to meet the child's
needs or gauge their own interests. '215 It concluded that judges should look at
these agreements on a case-by-case basis.216 Agreements made before divorce are
relevant to what is in the child's best interest, but should not control.217 Again, the
ALI did not consider the constitutional concerns. Rather, the ALl, without citing
empirical research or other support, concluded that parents are less likely to have
thoroughly explored the impact of their custody choices when they make
agreements prior to the divorce.218
As discussed above, this approach ignores the fact that due process demands
that parents, not judges, make the decision about their children's custody when
such decisions are not harmful. Parents can, and do, make good decisions
regarding their children, whether or not they are divorcing. Indeed, parents are
presumed to act in their children's best interests.219 The best interest standard fails
to recognize this fact; thus, it fails to defer enough to prenuptial and postnuptial
parental agreements.
Additionally, prenuptial and postnuptial custody agreements should be
binding on parents at the time of their divorce because these parents exercised
their fundamental right at one time and now have simply changed their minds.
Through an adoption process, parents can relinquish their fundamental right to
raise their children through private ordering.220 Similarly, when a parent
voluntarily enters into a custody agreement with a spouse, that parent exercises
his or her fundamental right to decide custody when the contract is entered. That
parent then waives any right to assert his or her fundamental right a second time.
Instead, parents can, and should, renegotiate these agreements as necessary. 221 If
the agreement becomes inappropriate, the parent has an obligation to change it.
214 Id. § 2.08 cmt. i.
2151Id
216Id
2 17 Id. § 2.06 cmt. a.
2 18 Id. § 2.08 cmt. i.
219 Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979).
220 Courts do not routinely inquire into whether the adoption is in the child's best interest.
It is presumed that parents will act in accordance with the best interest of their child, even
parents who are unable to raise their child. See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 8801.3 (West 1994)
(allowing parents to sign adoption agreement in the presence of an adoption service provider);
cf Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164-65 (1973) (holding that judges must defer to the decisions
of pregnant women, at least during the first two trimesters, regarding abortion).
221 Indeed, practioners would be wise to include a provision that indicates that by signing
the agreement, the parent waives the right to contest it in court absent parent unfitness or harm
to the child.
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Absent harm to the child, the parent should not be able to wait for trial to
challenge the agreement.
Additionally, when a parent has made an agreement and later refuses to
honor that agreement, the state's need to protect the child and have an efficient
process should trump the parent's fundamental right. In these situations, parents
may be acting out of anger at their spouse rather than out of true concern about
the custody arrangement previously agreed to.222 If the arrangement were harmful
to the child, or if the other spouse were unfit, the parent could successfully
challenge the agreement. 223 However, when the parent has merely changed his or
her mind, especially if it is due to anger at the other spouse, state interference is
not constitutionally justified. Rather, there should be some likelihood that the
child will actually be harmed by the custody arrangement before the state imposes
a process that will increase litigation and uncertainty.224
As discussed earlier, deferring to parental agreements regardless of when
they were made will lead to better custody decisions and a better custody
process.225 The state has a strong interest in preserving the welfare of the child
and an administrative and fiscal interest in reducing the costs and burdens of
custody proceedings. 226 Children also have an interest in prompt and non-
litigious proceedings. Thus, the state's parens patriae and procedural interests,
coupled with the child's interest, should be sufficiently important to trump the
parents' fundamental right when there is no threatened harm to the child.227
Currently, a parent's fundamental right to make childrearing decisions is
ignored in all but one jurisdiction.228 Instead, these states have a standard that
222 See supra discussion accompanying note 138.
223 See supra discussion accompanying note 139.
2 2 4 For example, in West Virginia, custody is prohibited if the parent who would
otherwise be allocated responsibility under a parenting plan has abused, neglected, or
abandoned the child, sexually assaulted a child, committed domestic violence, interfered with
the other parent's access, or made repeated fraudulent reports of child abuse. W. VA. CODE
§ 48-9-209(a) (2001).
225 See discussion, supra Part III.C. 1 (a)-(b).
226 Stantosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 766 (1982).
227 If the state's interests in improving the process and ensuring better child custody
decision were not sufficiently important to trump the parents' fundamental right, then two
different parental agreement standards would be constitutionally required. The appropriate
standard would then depend on when the parents made their agreement. For example, the
parental deference standard could apply to agreements made during divorce, while the best
interest or presumption standard could apply to agreements made before the divorce.
228 See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-227(2)(b) (2003) ("The [Montana] legislature
finds... that a parent's constitutionally protected interest in the parental control of a child
should yield to the best interests of the child when the parent's conduct is contrary to the child-
parent relationship."). While this statute appears to protect fit parents' fundamental right,
Montana's child custody statutes do not. Montana uses the least protective standard for parental
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gives judges the power to make these decisions rather than parents. Deference to
parental custody agreements should not be the standard by default, but rather by
design.229
2. Weaknesses of the Parental Deference Standard
Limiting judicial discretion will have many positive effects on the custody
process. But it will also have some negative consequences. One consequence is
that if courts defer to custody agreements, children may not have input into the
determination. Currently, many courts consider and honor the preferences of
older children when awarding custody.230 While the parental deference standard
will reduce their input, it is likely that parents will consider their children's
preferences, if known, when they contract, whether before or during the divorce.
Moreover, asking children to choose between their parents is problematic, 23' and
can be detrimental to the child and to the child-parent relationship.2 32 Thus,
whether judges should consider the child's preferences at all is uncertain at
best.2 3
3
Another negative consequence of this standard is that courts will enforce
custody arrangements that may not be "best" for children. It is possible that some
parents may bargain away custody in return for better property and alimony
provisions.234 Moreover, the less information the parents have when making their
agreements, the best interest standard: "[T]he terms of the separation agreement, except those
providing for the support, parenting, and parental contact with children, are binding upon the
court...." MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-201(2) (2003).
229 Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 79 (2000) (Souter, J., concurring) ("To say the
least... parental choice in such matters is not merely a default rule in the absence of either
governmental choice or the government's designation of an official with the power to choose
for whatever reason and in whatever circumstances.").
2 30 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. fit 13, § 722(a)(2) (1999); D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-
914(a)(3)(A) (2001); HAw. REv. STAT. § 571-46(3) (Supp. 2001).
231 Becker, supra note 87, at 188.
232 Even if they wanted to choose, children rarely choose to live with a parent because of
what is best for them. Rather, they may choose the parent who is more lenient, the parent whom
they do not blame for the divorce, the parent who is of the same or opposite sex, or the parent
who they simply like better at that time. Id. at 188-89.
233 Id. at 189-90.
234 When judges have discretion to determine child custody and child support, a parent
who desperately wants custody may agree to less child support than needed to ensure custody
will not be litigated. When child support cannot be bargained, it will have no effect on child
custody negotiation. States that have removed child support from litigation by establishing
support schedules have removed this impediment to fair bargaining. See Mnookin and
Maccoby, supra note 148, at 62, (concluding that support schedules and community property
laws made it easier for women to resist any attempts to link money and custody). But see
DIVIDING THE CHILD, supra note 4, at 156, in which the authors cite the results from a study of
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custody agreement, the less appropriate the custody arrangement is likely to be.
Because the parental deference standard does not distinguish between agreements
made before and during divorce, it might lead to "wrong" results. But, the
parental deference standard precludes placing a child in a custody arrangement
that would be harmful. Moreover, sometimes a custody arrangement that seems
"wrong" at one time later becomes "right. '235
But even accepting that some decisions may be wrong, the number of wrong
decisions should not be high. Parents can modify the agreement at any time if, for
example, the childcare provision/distribution of workload changes during the
course of the marriage. Even during the divorce process itself, the parents would
be free to determine a new custody arrangement so long as they could agree to it.
Only if they could not agree, would their pre-divorce agreement control. Further,
as parents become more familiar with this process and thus understand the
importance of updating agreements, even fewer bad agreements will remain.
Perfection cannot exist in this area.236 The judicial system must always
balance perfect decision making with efficient judicial processes.237 The more
perfect the result must be, the less efficient and more subjective the process
becomes. Under the best interest standard, the focus has been on achieving a
perfect result at the expense of having an efficient, certain process. It is time to
refocus this priority.
1,100 divorcing families in California. There was "no statistically persuasive evidence that
those mothers who experienced more legal conflict had to give up support to win the custody
they wanted." Id.
235 See supra discussion accompanying notes 140-41.
236,, 'The best that can be hoped for is a system that works better than others in most
cases, and which doesn't do too much damage in the instances where it doesn't [-work].'"
Mercer, supra note 88, at 409 (citing Richard Neely, The Primary Caretaker Parent Rule:
Child Custody and the Dynamics of Greed, 3 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 168, 186 (1984)). Justice
Neely wrote the landmark decision in Garska v. McCoy, 278 S.E.2d 357 (W. Va. 1981), which
is credited with developing the primary caretaker presumption.
237 See Stantosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 758 (1982) (balancing the parents' interest in
perfect decision making in a parental termination case with the state's interest in an efficient
process).
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IV. CONCLUSION
No one is satisfied with the current child-custody laws. Women's rights
advocates deride the gender-neutral standards as biased against women,238 while
fathers' rights advocates complain that they are the ones who are discriminated
against.239 Women's and fathers' rights advocates have attempted to solve child-
custody bias by suggesting that the legal standard should be changed to limit
judges' wide discretion.
Some of the more common goals of family law reform include the following:
first, encourage greater equality between mothers and fathers in childrearing;
second, promote private ordering and encourage parental cooperation; and third,
foster and protect the welfare of children by ensuring their continued involvement
with both parents.240 Neither women's nor fathers' rights advocates have
articulated a standard that would eliminate gender-bias in the courtroom,
encourage parental cooperation, and serve the best interest of children of divorce.
Instead, these groups have focused exclusively on only one of these factors:
gender-bias in the courtroom. They have thus advocated new legal standards that
would solely advance their own gender-based interests. Not surprisingly, neither
side agrees with the other's proposed standard.
Even if changing the legal standard (which cannot be done) could effectively
legislate equality, gender equality should not be the primary focus of child-
custody reform. By focusing attention solely on the gender ramifications of the
standard on parents, women's and fathers' rights advocates have lost sight of the
other goals of child-custody reform: to encourage parental cooperation and to
protect the welfare of children by ensuring their continued involvement with both
parents. Rather than arguing about what standard is best for mothers or fathers,
the emphasis should be on what standard is best for children and their parents:
what standard leads to a more tolerable process for all involved.
"Contemporary divorce law has increasingly recognized the legitimacy of
'private ordering'-the notion that divorcing parents should have broad latitude to
negotiate their own financial and custodial arrangements. '241 Because parents
must go through a legal process to get a divorce, they cannot escape the legal
238 See, e.g., Amy D. Ronner, Women Who Dance on the Professional Track: Custody
and the Red Shoes, 23 HARV. WoMEN's L.J. 173, 178 (2000); June R. Carbone, A Feminist
Perspective on Divorce, 4 THE FuTuRE OF CHILDREN: CHILDREN & DIVORCE 183, 192 (1994).
239 See, e.g., William C. Smith, Dads Want Their Day, A.B.A. J., Feb. 2003, at 38, 39;
Edward S. Rue, Comment, Gender Equity and Procrustean Presumptions: A Comment on the
Recent Changes in Wisconsin's Law Regarding Child Custody and Placement, 2001 Wis. L.
REV. 1177 (2001); Henry I. Shanosld, Two Parents for Every Child of Divorce: Sustaining the
Shared Parenting Ideal of Maine's Custody Law, 14 ME. B. J. 86, 87 (1999).
24 0 DIVIDING THE CHILD, supra note 4, at 10.
241 Id. at 8.
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system entirely, but it could certainly play a smaller role.242 A standard that
refuses to recognize and reward private ordering is unsound. The laws in most
states do just that.
A standard that gives judges wide discretion to decide child custody is less
than ideal for children. A standard that allows parents to make these decisions will
lead to better decisions being made. There should be no question that parents
know themselves and their children better than judges. While a standard that
gives judges wide discretion might seem to ensure that all children will end up in
good custody arrangements, they will do so under a crippled process. Litigation
will continue to be uncertain, lengthy, expensive, antagonistic, and gender-biased.
When courts defer more to parents, the process will improve. In addition,
certainty will increase, while judicial discretion will decline. Consequently,
litigation expenses and acrimony will decrease.
A standard that gives judges wide discretion to decide child custody is less
than ideal for parents. Such a standard impacts the parents' fundamental right to
decide their children's care and custody. It allows judges to decide what parents
will be doing rather than allowing parents to choose. A better standard would
minimize judicial discretion, maximize the parents' autonomy, and protect
children from harm. A parental deference standard would satisfy all three of these
goals.
Whatever standard applies to parental agreements, litigation cannot nor
should it disappear completely. It is precisely when parents cannot make
decisions for their child that the state should step in to protect the child. The
appropriate standard to then be applied is a discussion beyond the scope of this
Article and already well covered. But, should the parental deference standard
become the norm, more parents can be expected to enter into these agreements,
just as prenuptial agreements became more commonplace once their enforcement
became assured.
Family laws have changed so much during the last fifty years that accepting
custody agreements, reached before and during divorce, can happen. Initially,
states refused to enforce any prenuptial or postnuptial agreement. Now, states not
only enforce them, some states treat these agreements as contracts. 24 3 Initially,
states were hostile to joint custody. Now, judges not only tolerate it, some have
begun to prefer it.2 4 4 Thus, as society's views about marriage and parenting have
changed, family laws have also had to change. It is time to change the perception
that judges, rather than parents, should be making custody decisions. Our laws
should not only reward parents who take on this role, but expect it of them.
242 Id. at 56.
243 Gant v. Gant, 329 S.E.2d 106, 112 (W. Va. 1985).
244 Becker, supra note 87, at 169; see DIVIDING THE CHILD, supra note 4, at 107 ("This
overwhelming tendency for California divorce decrees to provide for joint legal custody is of
recent origin.").
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